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ABSTRACT 
Defense against terrorism both at home and abroad has become a priority in the 
United States.  As a result, resource allocation has also increased.  However, even as 
resources increase, they are still finite.  So the dilemma becomes how to efficiently 
allocate these limited resources.  Currently the data, while abundant, is confusing.  One 
suggested method is to allocate resources based on risk.  However, there is virtually no 
guidance on how that risk should be defined or what the parameters are in a risk-based 
approach.  Also, there is no flow of information model that outlines how to communicate 
to decision makers the risk reduction potential of each policy alternative.  
This thesis investigates the usefulness of quantitative risk analysis as an approach 
to determine the allocation of counter-terrorism resources.  This approach develops a 
simulation-based quantitative risk assessment method that allows for subjective elements 
and uncertainties.  The risk assessment information is then integrated with the cost of the 
alternatives to yield a risk-reduction-cost-tradeoff curve that guides decision makers with 
resource allocation decisions.  This approach is demonstrated by using the Port Security 
Grant Program as an example.  We find that the approach provides the decision maker the 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 
“We [Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)] assess that al-Qa’ida 
will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and U.S. interests abroad by a 
single terrorist organization.  We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which 
includes al Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and 
cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.”1  The DNI makes it clear that 
the terrorist threat to the U.S. is still very real and expanding.  The document goes on to 
assess that the number of activists calling themselves jihadists is increasing in both number 
and worldwide dispersion and that if this trend continues, the threat to the U.S. will 
intensify.  Clearly, terrorism remains a threat that must be taken seriously. 
Evidence supporting the DNI’s judgment is abundant.  The pace and lethality of 
terrorist attacks have increased substantially since the terrorists attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001 (9/11) as compared to the 1990s.2  Furthermore, nearly all 
statistics indicate an exponential increase in worldwide incidents of terrorism since 2002.3  
Indeed, it is only a matter of time before terrorists strike another significant attack on U.S. 
soil.  America was fortunate to have escaped another airline attack in which terrorists were 
planning to smuggle explosives material onboard U.S.-bound airliners originating in 
Britain and detonate the explosives over the Atlantic Ocean.  The plot was disrupted, in 
large part, due to successful counterterrorism work by British officials.4  This instance 
clearly demonstrates terrorists’ continued intent to attack America. 
                                                 
1 Director of National Intelligence, Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 
“Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” dated April 2006, available from 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/press_releases.htm (accessed 29 September 2006). 
2 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris (Washington, D.C.:Brassey’s, 2004),  91. 
3 Derived from multiple databases.  For example, see Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) database at http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp (accessed 16 September 2006).  Also see National Counter 
Terrorism Center (NCTC) database at http://wits.nctc.gov/ (accessed 18 September 2006) 
4 John Ward and Karen DeYoung, “Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets is Foiled: Britain Arrests 24 
Suspected Conspirators,” The Washington Post Foreign Service, 11 August 2006, available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/10/AR2006081000152.html (accessed 25 
August 2006). 
2 
The threat to America extends beyond the use of airlines as the attack method and 
includes other methods and weapons, such as weapons of mass destruction, computer 
viruses, and ships.  Other delivery means include the maritime domain, border exploitation, 
food sources, water supplies, and computer networks.  These delivery means create a 
significant dilemma due to the vast amount of options that exist.  The wide range of 
delivery means are made possible in part by America’s open society, which facilitates 
people entering the United States, and which also facilitates the movement of goods and 
services to and from the United States.  This has led to an increased attention to border 
security, which includes not only land borders but also water borders.  Moreover, the 
movement of vast amounts of goods demands that cargo flow freely and efficiently into the 
country either by air, land, or sea transportation modes.  All of these transportation methods 
have inherent vulnerabilities.  One can argue that all of these areas of vulnerability deserve 
security funding.  The challenge is to determine how to prioritize and in what proportions 
to allocate funding. 
B.  THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM   
“America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic 
terrorist attack on U.S. Soil.”  This statement, written by Stephen Flynn in his book 
AMERICA the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, 
echoes the findings of an independent, bipartisan group formed by the Council on Foreign 
Relations to evaluate the state of homeland security in the United States.5  Flynn’s main 
theme is that America needs to do more to protect itself from terrorism.  This is not an 
uncommon theme in the literature.  Accordingly, the money spent each year on homeland 
security is rising at nearly double the rate of inflation.6  Despite increased spending, 




                                                 
5 Stephen Flynn, AMERICA the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from 
Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), ix. 
6 Derived from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2006, available from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-
FY2006.pdf (accessed November 2, 2006).  The consumer price index rose 3.4% in 2004 and 3.8% in 2005.  
For the same years, the DHS budget increased 8.1% and 6.6%, respectively.   
3 
effectively utilize these limited resources and less focus on allocating more resources.  
Moreover, as the homeland security budget continues to rise, so does the public’s interest 
in how this money is being spent.7   
1.  Resource Allocation for Homeland Security 
Deciding how to effectively allocate limited resources to improve security is not an 
easy task.  One of the traditional approaches to security planning has been scenario-based 
planning in which planners determine a likely threat scenario and a suitable means to 
defend against it.  However, scenario-based planning is extremely challenging when 
defending against the asymmetric threat of terrorism due to its uncertainty as to the specific 
nature of the threat.  To account for this uncertainty, Sharon Caudle, a senior analyst with 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Homeland Security and Justice Team, 
advocates capabilities-based planning as one of the better approaches to resource allocation 
and results management.8  Paul Davis, of the RAND Corporation, defines capabilities-
based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide 
range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic 
framework.”9  The Department of Defense (DOD) has been using capabilities-based 
planning for several years, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recently 
adopted it as well.10  According to DHS, capabilities-based planning differs from scenario-
based planning and is intended to balance the threat and magnitude of a potential terrorist 
attack with the resources required to prevent and respond to them.11  DHS is using this 
approach to identify required capabilities needed to defend against a wide array of threats 
and provide a feedback loop to measure success in achieving them.12   
                                                 
7 Ralph Perl, CRS Report for Congress: Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring 
Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 1-2,  available from: 
http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL33160/ (accessed 28 November 2005) 
8 Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security, Approaches to Results Management,” Public Performance & 
Management Review 28 no. 3 (March 2005), 369. 
9 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and 
Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Strengthening National Preparedness: 
Capabilities-Based Planning, 1. Available from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm 
(accessed December 6, 2005) 
12 Ibid., 1. 
4 
In addition to using capabilities-based planning, DHS has endeavored to use risk 
management to help guide spending efforts.  This is partially attributable to the notion that 
“Risk management has received widespread support and interest from Congress, the 
President, and the Secretary of DHS as a tool that can help set priorities on how to protect 
the homeland.”13  Moreover, DHS has been directed to use risk-based planning to help 
guide spending efforts.14  This direction is based on an abundance of policy guidance that 
recommends, directs, or merely supports the idea of a risk-based approach to resource 
allocation.  For example, in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the 
President states: “[I, The President of the United States] encourage risk management 
strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure 
and key resources.”15  In addition to HSPD-7, several strategy documents have echoed and 
expanded upon the notion of risk management strategies. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, released in July 2002, establishes a 
foundation upon which to organize homeland security efforts and provides initial guidance 
on how to prioritize related efforts including resource allocation.  The Strategy identifies 
three strategic objectives for homeland security: prevention, protection, and response.  
These equate to the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States, protection by 
reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and response in order minimize the damage 
and effectively recover from attacks that do occur.16  The benefits of devoting resources to 
homeland security will be a reduction in risk of future terrorist attacks as well as the 
consequences should such an attack occur.  To assist decision makers on how to prioritize 
homeland security efforts, the Strategy provides guidance aimed at channeling resource 
allocation for homeland security. 
                                                 
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Risk Management, Further Refinements Needed to 
Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure (Washington, 
D.C.: GAO, December 2005), 19. 
14 Ibid., 20. 
15 President of the United States, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 (December 2003), 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (accessed 15 March 2006). 
16 President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002), 2-3, available 
from http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (accessed 15 March 2006). 
5 
The Strategy defines financial costs as “the amount of money, manpower, 
equipment, and innovative potential that must be devoted to homeland security.”17  These 
resources should be allocated with two goals in mind: to devote the right amount of 
resources to homeland security, and to spend those resources on the correct activities.18  
Furthermore, the Strategy specifies that in order to spend the resources on the correct 
activities, policymakers should allocate resources in such a way that the value gained is 
spread evenly across all sectors.19  This should be done with an attempt to equalize the 
value of risk mitigation per dollar.20  The right amount of resources should be determined 
by evaluating the benefit of reducing risk versus the additional cost while realizing that it is 
not practical to eliminate all risks.  Given the impracticality of eliminating all risks, 
decision makers need to establish an acceptable level of risk.   
The idea that risk cannot be eliminated is further supported in other literature.  For 
example, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets outlines a plan to reduce America’s vulnerability to attacks on critical 
infrastructure, stating “… we [the U.S. population] must accept some level of terrorist risk 
as a persisting condition in our daily lives.”21  Likewise, the 9/11 Commission released 
their final report in 2004 and made several recommendations that involved using a risk-
based approach.  The Commission states that America can be attacked in many ways and is 
still very vulnerable, and that no defense or protective measure is perfect.  The risks must 
be calculated in an effort to guide decision makers in making hard choices as to where to 
allocate resources.22  One of the specific recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission 
is in the area of transportation security.  The Commission recommends that “the U.S. 
Government should identify and evaluate transportation assets that need to be protected, set 
                                                 
17 President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 63. 
18 Ibid., 63. 
19 Ibid., 64. 
20 Ibid., 76. 
 21 President of the United States, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets (February 2003), 13, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (accessed 
Aug 11, 2006). 
22 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2004), 365. 
6 
risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways 
of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort.”23   
2.  Critique of Homeland Security Spending 
The 9/11 Commission, in the course of providing their recommendations, was quick 
to point out early fallacies with homeland security spending.  One particular example 
involves how DHS is allocating funds to assist state and local governments in their security 
efforts.  The Commission makes reference to one DHS methodology in which every state 
receives a minimum amount of funds regardless of any other criteria and another DHS 
methodology in which funds are allocated based on population size.  The Commission 
cautioned against allowing federal homeland security assistance to remain a program for 
general revenue sharing.  Furthermore, the Commission cautioned that homeland security is 
too important for “politics as usual,” and that Congressional representatives should not use 
these funds as a “pork barrel” to protect the interests of their home states or districts.  In 
light of this, the 9/11 Commission recommended that “homeland security assistance should 
be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.”24  
In December 2005, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project delivered another blow to 
policymakers regarding the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations when they gave 
Congress and DHS a failing grade on distribution of homeland security funding to states.  
They found: 
Congress has still not changed the underlying statutory authority for 
homeland security grants or benchmarks to insure that funds are used 
wisely.  As a result, homeland security funds continue to be distributed 
without regard for risk, vulnerability, or the consequence of an attack, 
diluting national security benefits of this important program.25 
Eben Kaplan, a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations, further 
critiques DHS grant spending.  He discusses grant program criticisms directed at DHS for 
wasteful expenditures and also highlights the need for a different approach to resource 
                                                 
23 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 391. 
24 Ibid., 396. 
25 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations (December, 
2005), 1.  Available from http://www.9-11pdp.org, accessed 5 October 2006. 
7 
allocation.26  He reviews the old methods for distributing DHS funds that awarded funds 
using a population-based formula that ensured each state received a minimum amount of 
funds.  Members of Congress capitalized on the old distribution plan to funnel DHS money 
to their constituents at home.  For example, the town of North Pole, AK with a population 
of 1,700, received a grant of $557,400.27  In another instance, the city of Santa Clara, CA 
used DHS funds to purchase a fleet of Segway scooters for their bomb squad.28  Kaplan 
goes on to discuss how DHS is acknowledging these shortfalls in its resource allocation 
methodology and is attempting to move toward an objective risk-based approach.  
Moreover, Secretary Chertoff is quoted as saying that “as we focus on the reality of what 
we’re trying to protect … we’re going to increasingly be looking to … approaches that put 
politics to one side and talk about real tangible things like risk.”29   
3.  Resource Allocation in Maritime Security 
Maritime security, specifically port security, is one area where DHS has attempted 
to implement risk-based resource allocation.  One of the challenges with port security 
resource allocation is the large number stakeholders involved.  The federal government has 
jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce and some waterway channels.  
Jurisdiction over ports resides with state and local governments.  Furthermore, ports can be 
a subsidiary of a public agency or structured under the private sector.  As a result, security 
at the ports varies.  Either municipal law enforcement or private port police can be the 
primary instrument of port security.  On the other hand, the consequence of a failure in port 
security extends well beyond local municipalities and involves numerous federal 
agencies.30 
The two primary Federal agencies involved in port security are the U.S. Coast 
Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.  The U.S. Coast Guard is the 
principal maritime law enforcement authority and the lead federal agency for the maritime 
                                                 
26 Eben Kaplan, “Risk-based Homeland Security Spending,” Council on Foreign Relations online 




30 John Fritelli, Port and Maritime Security: Background Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), 9, available from: http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RL31733.pdf  
(accessed 16 March 2005). 
8 
component of homeland security.31  Additional players routinely include the Transportation 
Security Agency (TSA) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD).   
It is important to understand the roles and motivations of different stakeholders in 
maritime security, because each has their own resources and funding.  For example, the 
USCG and TSA both have programs focused on improving port security yet they have 
unique funding sources.  The state and local agencies involved in port security are more 
complicated.  Their funding for port security comes in the form of DHS grant money from 
a combination of TSA and Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) funds.  ODP awards 
grants under Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and TSA awards grants through their 
Port Security Grant Program.32  The TSA portion of grant awards was eventually taken 
over by DHS’ Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).  
What remains, are three federal agencies playing key rolls in port security improvement—
USCG, TSA, and IAIP.  Furthermore, federal law and HSPD-7 call for the use of a risk-
based approach for port security resource allocation, 33 but provide limited guidance on 
what such an approach should look like.  Despite this lack of guidance, each the USCG, 
TSA, and IAIP have taken steps toward implementing a risk-based approach for port 
security resource allocation. 
In December 2005, the GAO evaluated agency progress in adopting a risk-based 
approach for port security.  The GAO found that the USCG, ODP and the IAIP have made 
some progress, with the USCG making the most progress, in utilizing risk management for 
resource allocation.  However, numerous challenges remain.  The GAO found that the 
USCG has identified strategic goals as they relate to preventing a terrorist attack and 
vulnerability to terrorism in the maritime domain.  The USCG has also made progress by 
identifying and evaluating security alternatives at the individual port level.  Furthermore, 
the USCG has completed three major security assessments at the port level, which has 
facilitated an understanding of how to prioritize risks within a port.  However, the GAO 
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concludes that the USCG risk-based approach lacks sufficient information to represent 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with port security.  More importantly, 
the GAO concludes that the USCG risk-based approach falls short in showing how the 
application of resources can be effective at reducing risk and producing the most favorable 
cost-benefit outcome.34 
Similar to the Coast Guard, ODP has made progress in using risk management for 
resource allocation.  They have set broad risk management goals that support a wide range 
of maritime goals, such as harbors, ports, and coastal approaches.  ODP has carried out risk 
assessments and evaluated mitigation options to help determine which ports should receive 
priority for grants.  Additionally, they have developed a risk-based grant selection process 
for awarding DHS grant money to corporations involved in homeland security projects.  
However, the GAO concludes that ODP has fallen short in developing a risk-based 
approach that allows risks to be compared and prioritized among ports.35 
IAIP has made limited progress in using risk management for resource allocation.  
They have experienced difficulty in conducting risk assessments of critical infrastructure to 
determine the risks of certain types of terrorist attacks.  The initial tool for completing this 
task was the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection, which fell short 
of accomplishing the task.36  The IAIP has since begun to develop a National Comparative 
Risk Assessment that will examine risks within and across various sectors.  This 
assessment is scheduled to produce the initial results by the end of 2006.  The IAIP has 
cited challenges with a risk management approach to resource allocation.  The challenge is 
the lack of information from other federal agencies, specifically, information that assesses 
the likelihood of various threat scenarios involving critical infrastructure attacks.37 
In summary, the GAO’s report indicated that the USCG, ODP, and IAIP have made 
progress in adopting a risk management framework for effective resource allocation, but 
the progress has been limited and challenges remain.  One possible reason for this is a lack 
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of sufficient guidance on how to implement a risk management framework.  Missing from 
the GAO report is that each of the agencies reviewed do not address the challenge of 
communicating risk analysis results to a decision maker.  This is important since the 
decision maker needs to make resource allocation decisions based on the risk analysis 
results.  The decision maker may not fully understand the methods employed in risk 
analysis or how to interpret the results.  Thus, it is essential to communicate risk analysis 
results in a clear manner that leads the decision maker through the assumptions and 
results.38  
C.  RESEARCH ISSUES TO ADDRESS 
There are two primary issues to be addressed concerning the use of a risk-based 
approach for homeland security resource allocation.  First, there has been an abundance of 
federal-level guidance directing the use of a risk-based methodology but little guidance on 
what such an approach should look like.39  Thus, it is necessary to develop a method by 
which risk can be quantitatively assessed and determine the feasibility of the method for 
homeland security resource allocation.  Specifically, what is needed is a quantitative 
analysis that incorporates methodology accounting for at least some of the subjectivity and 
uncertainties that are inherent in risk analysis.  Most analysts commonly associate risk 
quantification with assigning a single value to represent a risk component or the 
aggregation of several risk components.  This is not optimal in that most aspects of 
homeland security involve uncertainty,40 or random variables which are better represented 
using a range of values.41  This uncertainty and the associated range of values require the 
use of distribution functions which in turn requires mathematical modeling.42   
                                                 
38 David Vose, Quantitative Risk Analysis: A Guide to Monte Carlo Simulation Modeling (New York: 
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The second research issue centers on communication.  How does an analyst 
communicate quantitative risk analysis results to a decision maker in such a way as to be 
understandable and in a manner that allows a decision maker to evaluate risk reduction 
potential given multiple policy alternatives?  The decision maker needs to be able to 
allocate the budget in such a way that the maximum risk reduction is achieved, given a 
fixed budget.  
Developing a quantitative risk analysis methodology for resource allocation is not 
without its challenges.  This methodology first requires a definition of risk, as there is 
currently no single agreed upon definition of risk.  Given an operational definition for risk, 
we next must quantify, or measure, the risk.  Once given the capability to quantify risk, we 
can then proceed to assess the risk associated with the various alternatives.  This, in turn, 
requires a way to translate risk into management action.  In other words, how do 
policymakers use quantified risk to evaluate policy alternatives?  If these steps can be 
accomplished and operationalized, then there will exist a way to rationally allocate 
resources in such a way as to achieve the greatest risk reduction for the given amount of 
available resources. 
D.  THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
This thesis will investigate the usefulness of quantitative risk analysis as an 
approach to support decision makers in the allocation of counterterrorism resources.  
Furthermore, this approach will present a cost tradeoff analysis that highlights the 
robustness of resource allocation alternatives.  To explore these concepts, the author uses 
the Port Security Grant Program (PSG) as a resource allocation case study. 
This research is important because misallocation of homeland security resources 
can have serious implications.  Allocating resources based solely on equity considerations, 
as has been done in the past,43 gives insufficient protection to high-risk targets while 
providing overabundant protection to very low risk targets.  Homeland security 
policymakers should have the means to connect resources allocated to risk.  Specifically, 
they need a way to assess how resource allocation affects risk reduction.  Risks can be 
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difficult to eliminate, but risks can be reduced to acceptable levels.44  Ultimately, 
policymakers must determine the level of risk they can accept and allocate available 
resources to reduce the risks to achieve this.   
In addition to risk reduction, policymakers need to find allocations that are robust to 
changes in the threat.  Take for example the terrorist threat involving WMD, which can 
take at least three forms: nuclear, biological or chemical.  Allocating resources to achieve 
an acceptable level of risk with respect to nuclear threats may lead to unacceptable levels of 
risk from the other two forms of threat.  If the biological or chemical threat manifests itself, 
then the nation may experience unacceptable damage.  Policymakers need to have a way to 
investigate this robustness concern.  Importantly, policymakers need to know if there are 
resource allocations that yield acceptable levels of risk across a range of threats since it is 
difficult to predict what threat might prevail. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the risk literature and existing methodologies.  
The review begins with a descriptive analysis of the basic definitions of risk and its 
historical origins.  Next the author examines the evolution of risk within specific industries, 
notably addressing the key industries in which risk analysis methodologies have played a 
key role and are still present to this day.  The author then describes and evaluates attempts 
to implement risk-based methodologies in homeland security.  Finally, the author provides 
and analysis of the Port Security Grant Program which is a specific program within DHS 
that utilizes QRA. 
B. DEFINING RISK 
Existing approaches to risk management hinge upon the how risk is defined.  
Several definitions of risk can be found in the literature.  The word risk itself comes from 
the Italian word risicare (to dare).45  The American Heritage Dictionary defines risk as 
“The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger; a factor, element, or course involving 
uncertain danger; hazard.”46  The Society for Risk Analysis defines risk as “The potential 
for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property, or the 
environment; estimation of risk is usually based on the expected value of the conditional 
probability of the event occurring times the consequence of the event given that it has 
occurred.”47  One other way to view risk is “any uncertainty that affects a system in an 
unknown fashion whereby the ramifications are also unknown but bears with it great 
fluctuation in value and outcome.”48  While these definitions use different wording, the 
theme is consistent in that risk involves an undesirable event that leads to unwanted 
consequences.  
                                                 
45 Peter L Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1996), 8. 
46 The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1982), 1065. 
47 Society of Risk Analysis, available from http://www.sra.org/resources_glossary_p-r.php (accessed 20 
July 2006). 
48 Johnathan Mun, Applied Risk Analysis: Moving Beyond Uncertainty in Business (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 26-27. 
14 
Beyond the basic definition of risk itself, some experts have offered definitions for 
the broader concept of risk analysis.  Vlasta Molak, in Fundamentals of Risk Analysis and 
Risk Management offers the following:  “Risk analysis is a body of knowledge 
(methodology) that evaluates and derives a probability of an adverse effect of an agent 
(chemical, physical, or other), industrial process, technology, or natural process.”49  She 
goes on to point out that an “adverse effect” can be defined in many different ways.  Some 
examples include fatalities, injures, a failure of an industrial component such as a power 
plant, or a loss of revenue.50   
Another term often used synonymously with risk analysis is risk management.  
While not specifically defining risk management separately, Molak provides a distinction 
in that risk management deals with overall strategies for handling risk not just assessing 
risk.51  She refers to the insurance industry as one of the early examples where risk 
management strategies emerged.52  In a slightly different perspective, Peter Bernstein 
offers a way to look at risk management which is to focus on “areas where we have some 
control over the outcome while minimizing the areas we have absolutely no control over 
the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us.”53 
C.  THE HISTORY OF RISK 
Given the definitions of risk and the associated risk analysis and risk management 
spin offs, the reader can gain additional insight from a review the fundamental origins of 
risk.  Some date early acknowledgment of the existence of risk back to the Athenians over 
2400 years ago.  Terje Aven, in Foundations of Risk Analysis, quotes an excerpt from 
Pericle’s Funeral Oration in Thurcydidas’ “History of the Peloponnesian War”: 
We Athenians in our persons, take our decisions on policy and submit them 
to proper discussion.  The worst thing is to rush into action before 
consequences have been properly debated.  And this is another point where 
we differ from other people.  We are capable at the same time of taking risks 
and assessing them beforehand.  Others are brave out of ignorance; and 
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50 Molak, 1. 
51 Ibid., 4. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Bernstein, 197. 
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when they stop to think, they begin to fear.  But the man who can most truly 
be accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet in 
life, and what is terrible, and he then goes out undeterred to meet what is to 
come.54 
While the Athenians showed a basic understanding of risk, they had no real way to measure 
risk since they had no real number system.  In the words of Bernstein, “the only way to 
deal with risk [in those days] is to appeal to the gods and their fates.”55   
As risk analysis grew over the years it has become more rooted in probability 
theory.56  Part of this is due to the Hindu-Arabic numbering system which provided the 
roots for today’s modern conception of risk.57  Additionally, there were several key 
milestones that have led to the incorporation of more probability theory in risk analysis.  In 
the 1600s, Blaise Pascal introduced probability theory and Edmond Halley came up with 
the concept of life-expectancy tables.  Then in 1792, Pierre Simon de LaPlace used a 
rudimentary form of quantitative analysis to determine the likelihood of death without a 
smallpox shot.58  As risk analysis continued to grow into the 20th century, there emerges 
obvious distinctions in the various applications of risk.  These various distinctions are 
embraced by key applications, some of which are examined in the next section. 
D. KEY APPLICATIONS 
This section examines a sample of the key industries containing significant risk 
analysis work.  The author explores three primary industries: finance, nuclear, and defense.  
In most cases, risk concepts found their way into each of these industries as a result of 
scholarly research or safety studies and the concepts remain present to this day.  
1.  Finance Industry 
Much of the early work with respect to risk and the financial industry can be 
attributed to Harry Markowitz: 
In, 1952, Nobel Laureate Harry Markowitz, then a young graduate student 
studying operations research at the University of Chicago, demonstrated 
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mathematically why putting all your eggs in one basket is an unacceptably 
risky strategy and why diversification is the nearest an investor or business 
manager can ever come to a free lunch. 59 
Markowitz made his name in the financial industry when we published an article in 
the Journal of Finance entitled “Portfolio Selection.”  The paper was so influential that it 
earned Markowitz a Nobel Price in Economic Science in 1990.  The premise of his paper 
was that investors should focus on the complete wealth strategy and not just on individual 
security holdings.  The primary objective of his “Portfolio Selection” was to present 
investors with the thought that “expected return is a desirable thing and variance of return 
an undesirable thing.”60  While Markowitz made no specific mention of the word risk, it 
has since become synonymous with variance, or the “undesirable thing.”61  Markowitz’s 
work would end up providing the foundation for all future theoretical finance work.62 
The concepts introduced by Markowitz were further expanded upon by experts such 
as William Sharpe and others.  Sharpe is responsible for introducing the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, which essentially expresses the concept that higher levels of risk equate to 
higher expected returns.63  The combined work of Markowitz and Sharpe brought forth the 
concept of an optimally balanced portfolio, in which an investor could choose a portfolio 
that provided the best bang for the buck given their risk tolerance.  To analyze this concept 
of a balance between risk and return required a method by which risk could be measured.64  
This idea of measuring risk is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
2.  Department of Defense 
Risk management has been used in the Department of Defense (DOD) for years but 
has been illuminated even more recently with the release of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR).65  This report was significant in that the Department presented a new 
strategy-driven risk management framework that formed the foundation for much of the 
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QDR defense program.66  The framework is introduced with the following excerpt 
highlighting the importance of the new framework: 
Managing risk is a central element of the defense strategy.  It involves 
balancing the demands of the present against preparations for the future 
consistent with the strategy’s priorities.  It entails assuring allies and friends, 
deterring threats of coercion and aggression, and, when necessary, defeating 
adversaries.  It involves maintaining military advantages and developing 
new military competencies while dissuading future military competitors.67    
The DoD framework consists of four related dimensions:68  
• Force management [risk] – the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip 
sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force 
while accomplishing its many operational tasks; 
• Operational [risk] – the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term 
conflict or other contingency; 
• Future challenges [risk] – the ability to invest in new capabilities and 
develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid-to long-
term military challenges; and 
• Institutional [risk] – the ability to develop management practices and 
controls that use resource efficiency and promote the effective operation of 
the Defense establishment. 
The general strategy for implementing this framework is to identify the risks within 
each dimension and then determine how to mitigate them.  The framework facilitates 
tradeoff analysis among basic objectives and resource constraints.  Furthermore, by 
evaluating DoD in these dimensions, the DoD is focusing on issues concerning force 
development, key capabilities, and force sustainability.69 
The subsequent QDR, released on February 6, 2006, references the previously 
established risk management framework in the context of “balancing near-term demands 
against preparations for the future.”70  Furthermore the Department is evaluating an option 
to incorporate a risk-based approach into the acquisition process in place of the current 
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cost-based approach.71  The Chairman’s Assessment summarizes the Departments overall 
position on risk assessment as a necessary component of the QDR Strategy given the 
uncertain nature of the security environment of 2025.  He states “we must hedge against 
this uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities.”72  In other 
words, we accept risk when assessing which capabilities to pursue in the face of an 
uncertain future. 
3.  Nuclear Industry 
Risk management principles have touched other industries beyond finance.  Molak 
breaks some of these down and offers six types of risk analysis: chemical risk analysis, 
cancer risk analysis, epidemiologic risk analysis, probabilistic risk analysis (chemical or 
nuclear safety), and qualitative risk analysis.  Of these, the nuclear power industry provided 
the most relevant contribution for the study conducted in this thesis—it provided the source 
for concepts in probabilistic risk assessment.  In doing so, the nuclear power industry 
provides some of the early examples through the use of full-scope risk assessments.  The 
term “full-scope” implies that these assessments combined engineering modeling to 
quantify the threat and also an analysis of the undesirable outcomes.73  Similar terms have 
since become widely used, one of which is quantitative risk analysis (QRA).   
E.  QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
Initial risk concepts in industry were primarily qualitative and have since evolved 
into more quantitative.  This section analyzes existing quantitative risk analysis 
methodologies beginning with the prominent pioneers in the field and includes a 
descriptive analysis of the associated academic literature. 
QRA is a concept originally developed based on a nuclear reactor safety study 
sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975.74  Stanley Kaplan and John 
Garrick are two of the original pioneers of QRA and ventured to analyze risk by attempting 
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to determine what the future will entail given a certain course of action (or inaction).75  
They define risk as a “triple {e, p, x}” whose values are given by the answer to three 
questions: (1) “What can happen?”  (2) “How likely is it to happen?”  (3) “If it does 
happen, what are the consequences?”76  To answer these questions, one must develop a list 
of scenarios and for each, identify the probability of that scenario occurring and then 
identify the consequence should that scenario occur.  For example, one might consider the 
undesirable event of a hurricane.  The scenarios for a hurricane can be represented by the 
categories one through five with five being the worst.  The likelihood of occurrence and 
associated consequences can be derived from historical data which shows that higher 
category hurricanes are less probable than lower category storms.  Conversely, the 
consequences run opposite to the probabilities.  The higher category storm yields the worse 
consequences and the lowest category storm yields the least consequences.  Given all the 
possible scenarios, the probabilities can be combined to represent a cumulative probability 
which is then used to generate the combined risk of hurricane damage. 
Kaplan and Garrick also point out an important distinction when considering the 
ideas of probability and consequences in that it is common to hear risk described as a 
product of probability and consequence (probability x consequence).77  They suggest that 
this is misleading and recommend thinking in terms of the probability distribution of the 
consequence.  One way to conceptualize this point is to go back to the hurricane example.  
If one were to take a low probability/high consequence scenario and a high probability/low 
consequence scenario, the product of probability and consequence in both cases could be 
the same.  In reality, the two cases are quite different. 
Since Kaplan and Garrick established a portion of the founding framework for 
quantitative risk analysis, others have gone on to build upon and expand on their work.  
One particular case is the work of E. Pate-Cornell who addresses a way to view uncertainty 
and offers six levels of risk analysis.  She approaches the uncertainty challenge in risk 
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analysis by dividing uncertainty into two categories: epistemic and aleatory.78  Epistemic 
uncertainty results from a lack of fundamental knowledge or lack of a commonly accepted 
approach.79  For example, an epistemic uncertainty exists when two analysts derive 
different casual predictions for a nuclear event using their own respective approaches.  
Aleatory uncertainty reflects the randomness in well known phenomenon.80  For example, 
an aleatory uncertainty exists when an analyst specifies weather conditions for the nuclear 
event.  The weather variable for a hypothetical event in the future is an accepted random 
uncertainty.   
Pate-Cornell presents six levels of complexity in the characterization of risk that 
account for epistemic and aleatory uncertainty to varying degrees of detail:81  Level zero 
analysis consists of the identification of an unwanted event which is basically the 
identification of a threat.  For example, an unwanted event might include an airplane flying 
into a building, a nuclear event at a port or an improvised explosive device (IED) on a 
ferryboat.  This level is sufficient if the threat is known and can be characterized. 
Level one analysis builds upon the previous level and is used when not only when 
the hazard or threat is known, but one can also attempt to identify an upper bound on 
various outcomes should the threat manifest itself.  This level of analysis is only feasible if 
the value of the upper bound is known.  The applicability of this level of analysis will also 
depend on what outcome the analyst is interested in exploring.  For example, an analyst 
may choose to explore fatalities associated with a nuclear event.  In this case, the upper 
bound outcome might be described in terms of projected loss of life.  In the case of a 
nuclear event in a small town, the upper bound on loss of life becomes the population of 
that town.   
Level two analysis centers on the difficulty in trying to define a plausible worst-
case scenario for cases where the upper bound isn’t nearly as clear.  In the case of a nuclear 
detonation near a large metropolitan city, the worst-case outcome is not that clear.  The 
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worst case might be defined as a ten kiloton weapon in the heart of the city with high winds 
of 10 miles per hour which complicate the fall-out problem.  One can say that an even 
worst case would be a 100 kiloton weapon with 50 mile per hour winds blowing from the 
detonation location directly toward the city.  As this thought process progresses, the 
probabilities obviously become more unrealistic.   
Thus, the concept of this level of analysis is to define plausible upper bounds to the 
worst case scenario.  The question then becomes: “What is the maximum probable loss of 
life from a nuclear event?”  In some cases, this type of data is available.  For example, the 
consulting firm Abt Associates has conducted studies that projected fatalities associated 
with a nuclear attack at a seaport.  In their report they predict one million fatalities as a 
maximum “plausible” upper bound.82  The challenge at this level of analysis is the upper 
bound can be subjective.  For instance, the term “plausible” might mean something 
different based on how the term is being used.  A maximum plausible loss of life as a result 
of a nuclear explosion for a small city will likely vary significantly from a larger city.  
Thus, it is desirable to reduce this uncertainty. 
With level three analysis the objective is to produce a “best-estimate” analysis.  
This is accomplished by attempting to quantify probability estimates that lie near the 
middle of the probability distribution.  In other words, this level uses the median or 
expected value.  An important element of this level of analysis is the definition of the 
distribution.  Outcomes will not always fall in the center of the distribution function and 
may fall closer to the tails of the distribution.  The distribution can be defined in such a way 
that there is a higher distribution of outcomes that fall in the center but will still account for 
the variance in the tails. 
Level four and five analysis involves the use of Bayesian analysis which involves 
organizing the various scenarios into a group of mutually exclusive elements.  This type of 
analysis uses Bayesian statistics which are used to determine posteriori distributions of a 
variable by combining a priori opinion with observed data.83  While Pate-Cornell 
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incorporates Bayesian analysis into her analysis levels, risk analysts are divided on the 
utility of Bayesian statistics.84  Furthermore, Bayesian analysis exceeds the scope of this 
study.85 
Other work in the area of QRA is found in the abundance of academic texts.  In 
most cases, the academic literature strives to present how to implement the theories 
presented by risk experts such as Kaplan and Garrick.  David Vose describes quantitative 
risk analysis as an approach that not only examines ‘what if’ scenarios, but goes one step 
further to essentially account for every possible value that each variable within a model 
could take and weights each possible scenario using a probability of occurrence.86  
Quantitative risk analysis achieves this by modeling each uncertain variable using a 
probability distribution.  According to Vose, the goal of a quantitative risk analysis model 
is to calculate the combined impact of multiple uncertainties with some problem and 
generate a probability distribution of possible model outcomes.87  This represents the 
primary difference from a deterministic model which uses a single discrete value as 
opposed to a distribution of values. 
The importance of distribution functions is further illuminated by Aven in which he 
first presents the basic element of risk analysis using what he calls the “classical approach 
based on best estimates.”88  The underlying premise of this approach is that all input data 
are real and observed which is in accordance with traditional statistical modeling.89  Thus, 
to determine weight and probability, one is required to perform measurements.  For 
example, if the objective were to estimate the probability of an aircraft breaking in two as a 
result of an air to air missile attack, the analyst would conduct missile shoots against drones 
over and over again until the probability of the drone breaking in two can be accurately 
estimated. 
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Unfortunately, given the nature of many scenarios such as consequences resulting 
from a terrorist attacks, it is not feasible to generate real measurements.  A better approach 
is to represent uncertainty by using known quantities combined with experience and 
building distribution functions that represent the range of values that uncertain variables 
might take.90  Multiple uncertainty variables are then integrated together to generate a 
combined output distribution.  This can be accomplished through simulation. 
Johnathan Mun in Applied Risk Analysis, offers a simple view of simulation.  He 
states “A simulation calculates numerous scenarios of a model by repeatedly picking values 
from a user-predefined probability distribution for the uncertain variables and using those 
values for the model.”91  Mun discusses the importance of simulation and distributions to 
avoid the “flaw of averages” trap.92  By this, he is referring to a situation where an analyst 
uses a series of data points and calculates the average of the data.  Furthermore, the analyst 
suggests that this average is representative of all the data sources.  For example if the 
analyst is examining salaries within a company where top management makes significantly 
more income than most of the employees, then the distribution of wages is obviously 
skewed.  An average of this data would not be representative of the average salary for an 
employee at this company. 
F.  RISK-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Soon after 9/11, the GAO offered an approach to risk management with application 
to homeland security.  They begin by offering several definitions of a risk management 
approach.  First, they describe the approach as consisting of “a systematic, analytical 
process to consider the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset or individuals and to 
identify actions that reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack or event.”93  
Furthermore, they define a risk-based approach as one that uses a step-by-step 
methodology for assessing threats, risks, requirements, and includes information on how to 
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prioritize resource allocation.94  The GAO approach is founded on three pillars: threat 
assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality assessment.95  The threat assessment is 
based on several factors which include terrorist capability, intention, and consequences.  
The vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses in physical structures, personnel 
protection, and processes that might be capitalized on by a terrorist.  The criticality 
assessment is designed to identify and evaluate high value assets and infrastructure such as 
power plants, computer networks, and government buildings.   
While the GAO suggest in their report that “risk management is the best approach 
to guide program and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats,”96 
their framework merely offers a starting point and is mostly qualitative in nature.  The 
GAO makes an occasional reference to assigning loss values to key assets which, hints at a 
more quantitative approach, but provides limited guidance on how to objectively assign the 
loss values.97    
Shawn Reese, an analyst in the American National Government, Government and 
Finance Division of the Congressional Research Service, discusses the details pertaining to 
the risk factors that should be considered when allocating DHS funding.  These include 
perceived threats, homeland security capabilities, population size, and critical 
infrastructure.  Reese offers a non-comprehensive list of threats, a portion of which are 
considered significant.  Some of the list includes critical infrastructure items such as power 
plants, bridges, and computer networks.  Reese also suggests that risk analysts use a 
population factor described in terms of different densities across various cities when 
evaluating risk-related consequences.98  Furthermore, Reese discusses capabilities in terms 
of prevention and response and how capabilities can reduce risk.   
                                                 
94 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, A Risk Management Approach Can 
Guide Preparedness Efforts, 6. 
95 Ibid., 8 
96 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 
Preparedness Efforts, 11. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Reese, Risk-based Funding in Homeland Security Grant Legislation: Issues for the 109th Congress, 
17. 
25 
In addition to the GAO and CRS, other institutions have endeavored to apply risk-
based methodologies to homeland security.  One example is the work completed by 
Elisabeth Pate-Cornell and Seth Guikema in the area of homeland security in which they 
offer an approach to the modeling of terrorist threats.99  They perform an extensive analysis 
of threat scenarios, terrorist groups, probabilities, consequences, and time periods.  They 
evaluate capabilities in the general sense of merely protecting the targets analyzed in their 
scenarios.  Additionally, they develop a quantitative model of terrorist threats which is 
heavily dependent on expert opinion to aid in determining quantitative values based on 
professional subject matter authority.100 
The work of Pate-Cornell and Guikema provides extensive emphasis on the risk 
analysis piece but their analysis is overly reliant on expert opinion, which can be 
subjective.  Also, it would be more complete if their work went one step further by 
incorporating how their risk results can be used to evaluate and prioritize policy options 
given limited resources. 
Author Carl Roper, in his book on risk management for security professionals, 
describes a risk management process originally developed by the Risk Management 
Training Working Group (RMTWG) of the U.S. Security Policy Board, of which he was a 
member.  Roper’s begins by defining risk as a function of impact, threat and vulnerability.  
He defines risk and the elements as follows101: 
Risk = Impact x (Threat x Vulnerability) 
Threat x Vulnerability = Probability 
Impact = Expected Impact (Asset Value) 
                                                 
99 Elisabeth Pate-Cornell and Seth Guikema, “Quantitative Modeling of Terrorist Threats: A Systems 
Analysis Approach to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures,” Military Operations Research 7 no. 4 
(2002), 1. 
100 Ibid., 5. 
101 Carl Roper, Risk Management for Security Professionals, (Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 
1999), 17 
26 
Roper goes on to describe risk management as the process of selecting and implementing 
security countermeasures to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an acceptable cost.102 To 
do this, he offers five steps to risk management:103 
1. Asset Assessment – Identify critical assets, undesirable events and expected 
impacts, value/prioritize assets based on the consequence of loss. 
2. Threat Assessment – Identify threat adversaries, intent and motivation, capability, 
frequency, and degree relative to each critical asset 
3. Vulnerability Assessment – Identify potential vulnerabilities or undesirable events, 
identify existing countermeasures in place and their level of effectiveness in 
reducing vulnerabilities. 
4. Risk Assessment – Likelihood of an attack, likelihood of vulnerability exploitation, 
and multiply the two previous. 
5. Countermeasure Assessment – Identify countermeasures, costs, and tradeoffs, and 
select an appropriate protection strategy. 
Roper, while presenting his risk management process, reminds the reader that as 
with most quantitative risk methodologies, one of the difficult challenges lies in how to 
quantify risk.  The first four steps in Roper’s methodology are focused on this task.  One 
way to do this is to assign general levels such as “low”, “medium”, “high”, or “critical”.  
Another option might be to use a one to ten scale.  The basis on which to assign these 
ratings is somewhat subjective but can be aided by some description as to what constitutes 
each of the ratings.  Being able to quantify risk, whichever approach is used, is a useful 
step to facilitate policy options analysis. 
Beyond the need for quantification, Roper discusses the costs associated with 
various policy options.  Essentially, every countermeasure has a cost associated with it that 
can be measured in terms of dollars, inconvenience, time, or personnel.  In order to select 
the best countermeasure option, the cost associated with each countermeasure must be 
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determined.104  Consideration is given not only to the cost of tangible materials, but also to 
the on-going operational costs associated with a countermeasure and its implementation.   
Once the costs are known, Roper advocates a two step “analyze and prioritize” 
process.  The first piece of the analyze step examines how the asset value compares to the 
proposed cost of protection.  For example, does a low value asset require a lot of money to 
protect?  The second piece of the “analyze” step is to look at what policy option provides 
the best protection at the lowest cost.105  Finally, based upon the results of risk assessment, 
the last step is to determine whether a policy option will mitigate risk to an acceptable or 
conditionally acceptable level as defined by the decision maker. 
The second step is “prioritize.”  Roper recommends policymakers look at counter 
measures that address more than one undesirable event and also look at how the 
combination of countermeasure can collectively lower the risk for all the events 
identified.106  This is done using a matrix assigning risk reduction potential for various 
counter measures and then deriving a cumulative risk reduction potential. 
The next instance of a risk-based methodology for homeland security was offered 
by the RAND Corporation in 2005.  The RAND Corporation Center for Terrorism Risk 
Management and Policy defines risk in terms of the same three components introduced by 
Kaplan and Garrick back in the 1980s and others, but add the component of 
vulnerability.107  Vulnerability is defined as the probability that damage occurs, given an 
attack occurs.  With the addition of vulnerability, Rand defines the components of threat 
and consequences in a slightly different way.  Threat is defined as the probability that a 
specific target is attacked using a specific method during a specific time period and 
consequences are the magnitude and type of damage resulting from a successful terrorist 
attack.108  Essentially, by incorporating vulnerability, RAND introduces consideration of 
how well a target is hardened or protected. 
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One of the contributions of the RAND Corporation’s methodology is consideration 
of a wide range of possible threats in an uncertain environment.  The approach also 
attempts to address the problem of evaluating the risk for individual cities.  Resource 
allocation decisions have been made in the past without adequate consideration to factors 
that differentiate cities as being likely targets over others.109  For example, one would 
logically think that a city with a population 8 million should receive more resource 
consideration than a city with a population of 20 thousand.  The RAND monologue shows 
that risk estimates can be fashioned based on population factors such as density-weighting 
that can apply across a wide range of threat scenarios.  This is demonstrated by comparing 
their results of risk underestimation errors with that of other approaches.  While the 
approach presented by the RAND Corporation has significant relevance and goes one step 
farther than Kaplan and Garrick, it does fall short in that it does not demonstrate how 
policymakers can use a risk management approach to make resource allocation decisions in 
the resource limited environment of homeland security. 
One critique of the RAND methodology is the use of a “best estimate” approach to 
consequences combined with the likelihood of occurrence.  This approach can be 
summarized by the following formula: 
 Risk = P{A} * P{S|A} * E{consequence} 
         = P{occurrence} * E{consequence} 
In this formula, the threat is represented by P{A}, the probability that an attack 
occurs.  Vulnerability is represented by the term P{S|A}, the probability that damage will 
occur given that an attack occurs.  Vulnerability here is the physical weakness of structures 
and facilities, as well as, security short falls that might be exploited by terrorists.  Finally, 
the consequence is represented by the term E{consequence}, the expected value of the 
consequence.  This component represents a value such as the expected fatalities or 
expected economic loss given a successful attack.  The RAND methodology allows 
management action to focus on any one of these risk components.  Management action 
however, can affect both consequence and vulnerability which makes it difficult to assess 
policy option effects against a single risk component. 
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RAND acknowledges that consequences are determined by many uncertain factors 
and that these uncertainties can be accounted for using a full distribution of potential 
consequences or specific points contained therein.  They decided however, to simplify 
consequences using only the expected value of the distribution of damage.110  The expected 
value of a variable generally corresponds to the notion of the mean, or average.111  
Additionally, RAND indicates that the tails of the distributions are very dependent upon 
assumptions when considering events like terrorism due to lack of supporting data.   
Some experts such as Yacov Haimes, argue that using an expected value is an 
incomplete approach and that accurate risk assessments need to consider the entire 
distribution to include the tails, as opposed to an expected value.112  Furthermore, the 
expected value of risk does not adequately represent a measure that truly conveys the 
decision maker’s objectives.  However, Haimes offers one exception to the expected value 
argument in which the analyst can use a “conditional expected value” generated by the 
partitioned multi-objective risk method (PMRM).113  This method, instead of using the 
traditional expected value of risk, generates numerous conditional expected-value functions 
which represent the risk given that the outcome falls within specific ranges in which 
probabilities are exceeded.114 
A common theme in the homeland security risk methodology literature is the 
concept of breaking up risk into various components such as threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence.  The primary challenge with these components is obtaining the necessary 
data to quantify them.  While it is feasible to quantify consequence data, quantifying threat 
and vulnerability data faces more challenges.  This difficulty in quantifying threat and 
vulnerability data is expanded on below. 
The threat component of the risk formula presents a significant challenge.  RAND’s 
discussion of the threat component stimulates several questions as to what type of data is 
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required to define a threat in terms of the method of attack:115  What are the attacker’s 
objectives?  Has the attacker indicated a desire to carry out the type of attack in question?  
Does the attacker have the capability in terms of manpower, equipment or capability to 
carry out an attack?  One way to package these questions is to think of the threat as a 
combination of attacker intent and capability.116   
One of the difficulties with threat and vulnerability is that they are difficult to assess 
in enough detail to assign a value to them.  One can argue that the previous occurrence of a 
particular attack method lends itself to a higher likelihood of occurrence in the future.  
Likewise, intelligence data suggesting a potential attack method leads to higher probability 
values for that attack method.  While this makes intuitive sense, what threat values to 
assign in these cases does not.  For example, terrorists have shown a desire to use a ship as 
a weapon, as seen by the attack against the USS Cole that occurred in Yemen on October 
12, 2000.117  As a result, analysts will likely assign higher threat probabilities to future 
scenarios involving boats as weapons.  Once again, it is difficult to specify how much 
greater the probability might be. 
The same challenge occurs with attempting to assess capability.  One could argue 
that it is not difficult for terrorists to obtain small explosives and rent a power boat.  Others 
might argue that terrorists are not capable of obtaining explosives within the U.S. nor do 
they have the capability to rent a power boat.  Furthermore, one can make the argument 
that the capability exists once it has been confirmed either by demonstration or by reliable 
intelligence sources.  Despite the options for determining capability, the challenge of 
quantification still remains.  For example, is the best option to take a Boolean approach and 
quantify using a one or zero?  Or, should an analyst attempt to quantify using various levels 
of capability?  Once again, subjective interpretation plays a role here. 
Quantifying vulnerability presents similar challenges to quantifying threats.  
Vulnerability is defined to represent the probability or likelihood of an attack being 
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successful given its attempt.118  Vulnerability is often times a function of target hardness or 
a function of what security measures have been taken to prevent a successful attack.119  
Existing security measures are important because they help establish existing, or baseline 
risk.  Once the baseline risk is established, one can evaluate the impacts of future policy 
alternatives, thereby making the effects of policy alternatives cumulative.  
Similar to threat quantification, vulnerability values are likely to be subjective.  One 
method to approach vulnerability is to assess what characteristics will facilitate or allow the 
attacker to carryout the desired method of attack.  For example, if the attacker has the 
ability to carry out a suicide attack on a boat by placing a bomb in a backpack and if 
passengers are allowed to carry unscreened bags onboard the boat then this becomes an 
area of vulnerability.  Likewise, if an attacker has the ability to attack a ferryboat by 
placing an explosive inside a vehicle to be transported on the ferry and if the vehicles are 
not screened for explosives then this too becomes an area of vulnerability. 
In summary, while all the quantitative risk analysis methodologies do not 
specifically contain the components of threat, vulnerability, and consequence exactly, most 
are founded upon the basic concepts of risk pioneers such as Kaplan and Garrick.  From a 
conceptual viewpoint, all the methodologies acknowledge that uncertainties exist about the 
possibility of an unwanted event and that bad things can happen which are represented by 
some type of loss.  The methodologies provide a good foundation for the incorporation of 
quantitative risk analysis into homeland security decision resource allocation but could be 
more complete.  The methodology proposed here attempts to offer a clearer picture of QRA 
and in doing so, explores its application to the Port Security Grant Program. 
G. RISK-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR THE PORT SECURITY GRANT 
PROGRAM 
1. Background 
Prior to describing the specifics of the Port Security Grant Program, the author 
provides the reader with a brief overview of the importance of the maritime domain and the 
associated maritime threats to maritime security.  This background information provides 
the motivation for using the PSG as our case study. 
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In today’s global economy, more than 80 percent of world trade travels by water via 
a global maritime link.120  The international system includes 30 megaports that form the 
hubs of the world’s trade network.  Over 75 percent of the global maritime trade and more 
than half of the world’s daily oil consumption pass through a limited number of strategic 
international straits and canals.121  Additionally, the U.S. maritime system includes over 
3,700 cargo and passenger terminals operating out of more than 300 sea and river ports.122  
The marine geography under U.S. jurisdiction covers nearly 98,000 miles of coastline and 
over 3.5 million square miles of ocean area.123  
The expansive maritime system provides a backbone for the uninterrupted flow of 
shipping.  Many companies rely on the maritime system to support their just-in-time 
delivery approach for goods and services.124  Companies avoid stockpiling or maintaining 
a reserve of energy, raw materials, and key components, which means that any interruption 
in the flow of goods can have implications for the national and global economies.125  While 
maritime security has recently come under national and international scrutiny, the idea of 
disrupting the flow of maritime goods has been around for some time.  For example in 
1956, Egyptian forces shut down the Suez Canal for over a year by sinking ships in the 
narrow waterway.126  While at the time the global trade impacts were minimal, 
presumably, a similar event today would have a much larger effect since nearly 14 percent 
of the world’s trade passes through the canal.127  Furthermore, the consequences of a  
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current day attack could include damage to port facilities, loss of life, a spike in oil prices, 
increased shipping costs, port delays, environmental hazards, and lost revenue for business 
unable to receive their products. 
There is reason to be concerned that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda might engage 
maritime targets directly or use the maritime domain to support their activity.  Al Qaeda 
has a history of exploiting the maritime domain to support their efforts including creating 
fraudulent documents such as seaman’s licenses that allow them travel to ports without a 
visa.128  They have been known to raise money through arms smuggling, drugs trafficking, 
and slavery.129  Coalition naval forces have interdicted over a hundred Al Qaeda operatives 
who were using working sail boats to transport weapons and drugs in the Persian Gulf.130  
Additionally, the intelligence community has discovered that Al Qaeda owns and operates 
a fleet of vessels used to ferry operatives, bombs, money, and commodities using the 
maritime domain.131  It is believed that an Al Qaeda owned ship was used to deliver the 
explosives used for a car bomb that killed five Americans in Saudi Arabia in November of 
1995.132 
The maritime domain provides not only a medium for transit but also presents an 
array of targets that fit terrorist objectives.  Ports are potential targets because of their 
economic and symbolic importance.133  Security experts are concerned that terrorists could 
use the maritime transportation system to smuggle personnel, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), or other hazardous materials into the United States.  The specific threat scenarios 
are numerous and include using maritime vessels as weapons against ships carrying people 
or chemicals, launching a cruise missile from a freighter off the U.S. coast, subsurface 
attacks using SCUBA equipment, and mines in shipping channels.  The CIA warned that 
Al Qaeda was focused on advancing their maritime capabilities.  In May 2002, a joint 
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Moroccan-CIA operation disrupted an al Qaeda plot to attack U.S. and British ships in the 
Strait of Gibraltar using speedboats loaded with explosives.  During this operation the CIA 
seized an al Qaeda maritime manual detailing the best locations to strike different types of 
ships and the quantity of explosives needed to cause critical damage.134 
It is clear that maritime security ought to be a priority for homeland security 
decision makers as the maritime domain offers attackers an avenue to either execute or 
facilitate and attack against the United States.  The U.S. Coast Guard in particular has 
created the largest port security effort since World War II.135  One particular piece of the 
port security effort is the Port Security Grant Program.  This program primarily focuses on 
the threat to passenger and vehicle ferries.136  Ferries have been considered by terrorists as 
a ripe target with the potential for a large number of casualties.  Most recently, in February 
2004, terrorists detonated eight pounds of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) onboard a Philippines’ 
Superferry 14 killing 116 people.137 
2.  The Port Security Grant Program Overview 
The DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 provides $150 million for port security 
grants.138  DHS developed the PSG program and charged its Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) with program administration.  
SLGCP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, which has now become the Office of Grants 
and Training (OGT), currently administers the program.139  The grants provide funding for 
projects that improve the physical security in the Nation’s most at-risk seaports.  The 
program mirrors the intent of Congress and the Administration to protect critical 
infrastructure from terrorism involving the use of explosives and non-conventional threats 
that would cause major interruptions in the flow of commerce and substantial fatalities.140  
Additionally, the administrators of the program place a strong emphasis on prevention and 
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detection against the threat of an IED delivered via small craft, or onboard a ferry using a 
carrying device such as a backpack or vehicle.141   
In order to determine how best to appropriate funds under the program, DHS 
administrators developed a risk-based methodology to determine the most at-risk seaports.  
While the methodology shows progress in the use of QRA, it is not without its challenges 
and shortcomings.  The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) in concert with the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Directorate (IAIP) 
developed the following formula:142 
 Risk = Consequence x Vulnerability x Threat 
Consequence includes the potential effects on people, economic damage, national 
security, and impacts associated with possible hazardous materials that might be involved.  
Vulnerability considers factors such as the distance from the open water and the number of 
port calls.  Threat considers any existing threat information such as intelligence estimates 
provided by the USCG and the intelligence community.  Threat also considers the number 
of previous incidents at a given port and vessels of interest.  The formula was applied to the 
Nation’s 129 largest volume ports and 66 port areas were identified as at-risk.143     
Grant awards for the 66 ports were first determined by dividing the ports into four 
tiers.  Tier one represented those ports with the highest risk and tier four represented those 
ports with the lower risk.144  ODP allocated grant money to each tier and then ports within 
each tier competed for the funds.  Part of the evaluation to award grant money to port 
projects consisted of a field review process.  This process was managed by the applicable 
USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) for which the project applies and considered four 
primary factors.  First, the COTP considered how well the project supported the priority to 
protect against the IED threat.  Second, the COTP considered how well the project 
addressed the priorities outlined in the Area Maritime Security Plan which is a plan that 
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outlines operational and physical measures associated with each of the maritime security 
(MARSEC) levels.145  Third, the COTP considered how the project coincided with security 
priorities for the specific port area based on personal expertise and experience.  Finally, the 
COTP performed a cost-benefit analysis to determine the potential risk reduction given the 
cost of the project.  The overall objective of the last step is to award grants that offer the 
highest potential for risk reduction for the least cost.   
3.  Critique of the Port Security Grant Program 
In February 2006, the DHS Inspector General (IG) conducted an evaluation of the 
PSG and identified several shortcomings in their risk-based methodology.  The DHS IG 
analyzed details regarding how decision makers evaluated potential risk reduction for the 
national priority threats and the potential risk reduction for the least cost.  The details are 
presented in Table 1 which depicts the scoring system used for the Field Review Process.  
The COTP was individually responsible for awarding the scores and often did so, based on 
personal experience and knowledge of his port area.146 
 
Criterion  Score 
Risk reduction potential 20 pts* 
      Prevention/detection of underwater IED attack (10 pts)  
      Prevention/detection of IED attacks by small craft (10 pts)  
      Prevention/detection of vehicle born IEDs on ferries (10 pts)  
Consistency with Area Maritime Security Plan 5 pts 
Applicability to local security priorities 5 pts 
Potential risk reduction for least cost 5 pts 
Total possible score 35 pts 
*The National Review Process subsequently awarded points for either a combination of 
underwater and small craft attacks or vehicle born IEDs, but not both. 
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The DHS IG reported that there were issues regarding how field reviewers scored 
projects relative to each other.  The report noted that COTPs tended to award project scores 
differently, resulting in a wide range of scores between ports.  For example the Houston 
port area projects scores ranged from 9 being the lowest to 30 being the highest.148  
Whereas the port of New York/New Jersey, also in the same risk tier had scores that ranged 
from 3 being the lowest to 17 being the highest.149  The report highlighted the fact that 
subjectivity is inherent in the process and relies heavily on the judgment of those assigning 
the scores.150  The IG recommended that program administrators enhance the 
standardization of the field review scoring methodology.   
The GAO further critiqued the PSG methodology as being limited in the ability to 
compare benefits of security measures and their potential for risk reduction.151  
Additionally, the GAO suggested that the values being used for consequence data might 
not accurately represent the possibilities of damages from a terrorist attack.  For example, 
one method currently used to evaluate potential consequences of an attack on a ferry is to 
use the average number of daily passengers.152  This alone, does not accurately represent 
the full range of consequences in terms of impact on people. 
Another recent study involved several agencies who worked together on a project to 
develop a mission oriented risk and design analysis of critical information systems.153  One 
of the key findings from this study was the challenge in how to conduct an effective cost-
benefit analysis after having used a risk-based methodology.  The paper highlights the fact 
that in traditional cost-benefit analysis, policy alternatives are considered independent of 
each other.  This limits the ability to compare risk-reduction potential across a wide range  
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of policy alternatives given their associated cost.  The findings of this study echo one of the 
shortcomings in the current PSG program methodology as critiqued by the DHS IG and 
GAO. 
In summary, the Port Security Grant (PSG) program is one of the more recent 
examples where decision makers attempt to use a risk-based approach for resource 
allocation and specifically attempt to apply quantitative risk analysis (QRA).  DHS has 
made it a priority to use a risk-based methodology to ensure that funds are available to the 
Nation’s highest risk ports.154  While their efforts have shown significant strides to 
effectively utilizing such an approach, shortfalls still exist.  These seem to exist for two 
primary reasons.  First, insufficient efforts were made to account for the subjectivity and 
uncertainties that often accompany risk-based methodologies.  Second, DHS evaluators 
involved in the review process where scores were assigned to various criteria often scored 
projects differently.  DHS evaluators also lacked an efficient method to evaluate the 
tradeoff between risk reduction and project cost.   
                                                 
154 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program: Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit, 3.   
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III. FORMULATION OF THE RISK-BASED RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents a conceptual model of a risk-based approach to the resource 
allocation problem confronting decision makers managing homeland security programs 
directed at reducing terrorist risk.  It provides an operational definition of risk that serves as 
a basis for resource allocation decisions that respond to the potential for risk reduction of 
each policy alternative.  In doing so, the mathematical notation for the remainder of this 
thesis is established.  Next, the chapter sets out the process to be followed in order to obtain 
the quantitative information necessary for the risk-based approach presented and identifies 
the key information and data requirements to do so.  The chapter concludes with a 
schematic to help the reader visualize the conceptual model. 
B. THE DECISION MAKER’S OBJECTIVE 
This methodology assumes decision makers want to maximize risk reduction and 
make resource allocation decisions consistent with this objective.  Thus, decision makers 
are assumed to allocate homeland security and defense resources so as to achieve the 
greatest reduction in risk relative to the current situation and existing security measures 
(baseline risk). 
C. THE DEFINITION OF RISK 
Following the work of Kaplan and Garrick, Pate-Cornell and others, risk is defined 
here as the likelihood, or probability, of an “unwanted” event (consequence) occurring.  
This event is characterized by consequence, or losses, that are beyond what the decision 
maker can tolerate or deems acceptable.  The consequences are denoted by the random 
variable C  and maximum acceptable value by *c .  Risk, ,R  is then defined by the 
probability of the event in which the consequences exceed the maximum acceptable value 
denoted by: 
  { }* .R P C c= ≥  
For example, consider a decision maker whose primary concern is the potential 
casualties resulting from a bomb attack at a major U.S. port facility located near a large 
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metropolitan city.  In this case, C  represents the magnitude of casualties resulting from the 
attack and is random because it is difficult to predict with certainty the exact level of 
casualties.  The maximum acceptable value *c , on the other hand, is known to the decision 
maker and in this case represents a threshold level of casualties.  In other words, the 
decision maker cannot tolerate casualties in excess of this value so the event described by 
*C c≥  is to be avoided.  Note that, if this event is highly unlikely to occur meaning a low 
probability ( )P  of occurrence, then the decision maker may treat the event as one of 
“acceptable risk.”  Conversely, if the event is considered highly likely or even likely to 
occur, then the decision maker would be inclined to treat the event as one of “unacceptable 
risk,” and would take some action to reduce the risk to an “acceptable level.” 
Figure 1 shows risk represented in terms of the probability density function (PDF) 
for .C   We denote this PDF by ( ).Cf c   The x-axis represents the outcome variable such as 
fatalities from attack, and the y-axis represents the probability weighting for the outcome.  
Therefore, an analyst would interpret the distribution function considering where *c  is 
plotted and examines the area under the curve to the right.  This area represents the 
probability that C  is equal to or greater than the decision maker’s acceptable outcome level 
*c .  This area is the risk ( )R   and represents the probability that casualties will exceed that 
level indicated by *c . 
 
 
Figure 1 Distribution Function. 
 





D. MANAGEMENT ACTION AND THE ASSOCIATED RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
As previously established, it is not feasible to completely eliminate all risk.  Risk is 
dynamic and is subject to change as a result of management action.  Decision makers 
implement policy alternatives with the goal of reducing risk.  This is the basis for most 
interpretations of risk management.155  Management action is expressed as a set of policy 
alternatives denoted by A  that is composed of N objects: 
 { }1 2 3, , ,..., NA a a a a=   
Associated with each of these alternatives is a cost.  Thus, each alternative has an 
associated budget which is denoted by nb .  Therefore, the budgets corresponding with the 
identified set of alternatives is defined by the set B composed of N objects: 
 { }1 2 3, , ,..., NB b b b b=   
In the bomb attack at a port example, consider four possible policy alternatives.  
The first uses funds to install a fence around all port facilities with gated access and thus 
reduces vulnerability.  The second purchases a contract for armed security personnel to 
patrol the grounds at regular intervals and thus also reduces vulnerability.  The third 
purchases security cameras to monitor port facilities and fence lines.  The fourth provides 
funds to local emergency response authorities to improve response time and capability that 
would, in turn, reduce consequences resulting from an attack. 
Given the proposed set of alternatives and associated budgets, the decision to 
allocate or not allocate funds can be denoted by D  composed of N objects: 
  { }1 2 3, , ,..., .ND d d d d=  
Therefore, nd = 1 if na is chosen for implementation.  Conversely, nd = 0 if na is not 
chosen for implementation.   
Finally, most decision makers are under budget constraints in one form or another.  
Thus every resource allocation decision will be subject to these budget constraints.  To 
                                                 
155 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, A Risk Management Approach Can 
Guide Preparedness Efforts, 7. 
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represent this, F  denotes the total budget available to the decision maker for the security 










E. MANAGEMENT ACTION AND RISK 
 Each resource allocation decision will have some affect on risk.  Furthermore, one 
can assume that each policy alternative is effectual; i.e., ( ) / 0n nC a a∂ ∂ < .  This implies a 
connection between risk and management action.  This critical interaction is represented by 
showing the dependency between the risk R  and the decision variable D : 
  ( ) { ( ( )) *}R R D P C A D c= = ≥  
Finally, the current situation, or baseline risk, represents the “do nothing” approach and is 
denoted by {0,0,...,0}D = and is represented by (0).R  
F. RISK REDUCTION 
Assuming that all possible policy alternatives are effectual further assumes that 
( ) (0)R D R≤ .  So the reduction in risk is represented by: 
 ( ) (0) ( ) { (0) *} { ( ( )) *}.R D R R D P C c P C A D c∆ = − = ≥ − ≥  
This equation shows that the change in risk is a function of the decision maker’s choice to 
implement a policy option.  The policy option will reduce risk by some amount below the 
existing baseline level.  This change also equates to a corresponding change in 
consequence outcome. 
G. RISK-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
Risk-based resource allocation can now be formulated in terms of maximizing risk 
reduction.  The decision maker desires an allocation of funds so as to maximize risk 
reduction: 
 max ( )
D














H. REQUIREMENTS OF THE RISK-BASED APPROACH 
The key to implementing a risk-based approach is contained in the risk reduction 
formulation ( ) (0) ( )R D R R D∆ = − .  The analyst must calculate ( )R D and, implicitly, 
( ) /n nC a a∂ ∂ .  In other words, how much is risk reduced as a function of the decision to 
implement a policy alternative.  Determining this amount of risk reduction is the 
fundamental problem in a “risk-based” approach.  Given this amount of risk reduction, it is 
a relatively simple task for an analyst to calculate the optimal allocation using established 
results from the field of mathematical programming. 
The computation of ( )R D requires the probability density function ( )Cf D  
(equivalently the cumulative distribution function).  This, in turn, requires the model 
describing the consequences function of the implemented alternative, ( ( )).C A D   In 
principle this can be done by theoretical manipulations of the probability models 
representing the uncertainties inherent in ( ( )).C A D 156  Thus, the necessary data and 
information to implement a risk-based approach is that required for the construction of 
( ( ))C A D and the specification of the probability models for its uncertain components.  
I. FORMULATION SUMMARY 
The process of risk-based resource allocation is depicted in Figure 2.  The schematic can be 
read from top to bottom.  The process begins with decision maker identification of the 
consequence of concern C .  The magnitude of these consequences is a function of the 
various policy alternatives and thus becomes ( ( ))C A D .  Next the analyst determines areas 
of uncertainty and specifies the associated probability models.  These models are then used 
to derive ( )cf D .  Next, given the decision maker’s risk maximum accepted value of risk 
( *)c , the analyst derives risk ( )R D .  Finally, the decision maker incorporates the total 
budget ( )F , the cost to implement the chosen alternative combination ( ),B D  and the 
associated impacts on risk reduction ( ),R D∆  to make resource allocation decisions.  This 
final step whereby the decision makers desire to maximize risk reduction given the funding 
constraint is once again denoted by:  
                                                 
156 A. Papoulis, Probability, Random Variables and Stochastic Processes, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
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IV. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS USING SIMULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents derivation of ( )cf D by means of simulation (Figure 3).  The 
derivation of ( )R D from purely theoretical considerations using probability theory is 
impractical because of the complexity of the relationships.  However, it is feasible to utilize 
a simulation-based approach.  Simulation is an established tool for quantitative risk 
assessment that has proven very useful in many areas of decision making when a large 
amount of uncertainty exists.157  Exploring the applicability of simulation in resource 






Figure 3 Risk-based Methodology, Simulation Piece 
 
                                                 
157 James R. Evans and David L. Olson, Introduction to Simulation and Risk Analysis (Upper Saddle 













B. SIMULATION EXAMPLE 
To introduce the concepts of simulation the author presents a step by step example 
using the scenario of an explosive device detonated onboard a passenger boat.  Following 
the concepts introduced in the previous chapter, the first step is to identify what undesirable 
event and associated outcomes are of concern to the decision maker.  For this example, the 
undesirable event is the loss of life due to a bomb explosion onboard a passenger boat.  
Therefore, the decision maker is interested in policy alternatives that could potentially 
minimize loss of life.  Next, the analyst needs to quantify the potential fatalities given a 
bomb explosion onboard a passenger boat.  
The number of fatalities will be dependent on several factors, but the three most 
important are passenger load, explosive size, and location of the explosive relative to 
passenger concentration.  The first part of passenger load is to determine the passenger 
capacity of the boat.  The analyst can obtain this if the type of boat is known.  This example 
will look at one boat with a passenger capacity of 500 people.  Next, the analyst should 
attempt to obtain historical data that shows how many people are typically on the boat.  
One approach is to obtain an historical average, keeping mind that there are instances when 
the boat has more or less passengers onboard.  For this example, the average number of 
passengers is 250.   
Now that a maximum passenger capacity and average passenger load data have 
been obtained, it is possible to define a passenger distribution using modeling software 
such as Excel or Crystal Ball.  For example, suppose the available data suggests a normal 
distribution with a mean of 250, truncated between 0 and 500, represents the number of 
passengers on board.  Figure 4 shows the probability density function for this distribution 
when the standard deviation equals 100 which is set to represent a wide range of passenger 
loads.158  If y  denotes the number of passengers then (250,100;1,500).y N∼  
 
                                                 
158 The standard deviation is normally calculated based on actual data.  Given the absence of actual data, 
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Figure 4 Example Model Passenger Distribution 
 
The second factor that will affect fatalities onboard the boat is the size of the 
explosive itself.  Once again, there are several factors that will determine how big an 
explosive might be.  For this example, the company operating the boat does not allow 
passengers to carry any baggage onboard but does routinely transport shipping packages on 
its storage deck.  Therefore, the most feasible attack method is to hide an explosive in one 
of these containers onboard the boat.  The analyst can then use the maximum package size 
allowed on the boat to help define how large the explosive might be.  Another factor to 
consider is the explosive type.  Blast yields vary depending on explosive types and how the 
explosives are packaged.  A given weight of one type of explosive may have a much higher 
yield than the same weight of another explosive.  For this example, the analyst will assume 
the explosive type is TNT.  Even though explosives can be constructed using different 
using different compounds, most can generally be converted to a TNT equivalent weight. 
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Now that the analyst has established the maximum package size and the explosive 
type, it is possible to define an explosive size distribution.  For this example, the analyst 
has determined that the maximum TNT explosive size is 50 pounds.  Since not all packages 
are capable of packaging an explosive of this size, the analyst will specify a probability 
distribution for package size.  This may reveal that the boat predominantly carries packages 
that will conceal a 30 pound bomb.  Furthermore, assume the analyst believes another 
Normal distribution with a mean of 30, standard deviation of 10 and truncated between 0 
and 50 is sufficient to represent the uncertainty in bomb size (Figure 5).  If x  denotes the 
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Figure 5 Example Model Explosive Distribution 
 
The next step in the model construction is to define a relationship between the 
passenger fatalities and the explosive distribution.  To do this requires an analysis of blast 
effects to establish a relationship between explosive size and lethal distance.  Many factors 
go into this such as explosive casing and structures surrounding the explosive itself which 
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might include containers, flooring, walls etc.  Several blast effect tools are available that 
can aid an analyst in determining this relationship which can be defined in terms of a lethal 
radius.  Knowing the lethal radius as a function of the explosive size allows the calculation 
of the number of expected casualties based on the number of passengers within the lethal 
radius.  This function is denoted by: 
 2( )r x a bx cx= + +  
Where E is the size of explosive and a, b and c are constants derived using explosive size 
and corresponding lethal radius data.  Using the lethal radius, one now calculates the lethal 
area using the formula 2.rπ  
Next, the analyst uses this lethal area to calculate passenger casualties.  One 
approach is to determine the passenger area onboard the ship.  Here, the assumption is 
made that passengers are uniformly distributed within the passenger compartment.159  
Given the total number of passengers and further assuming a notional two feet between 
passengers, it is possible to calculate the passenger area which is denoted by S .  The 
maximum passenger area is constrained by the total passenger capacity.  Finally, casualties 
are calculated by multiplying the ratio of lethal area to passenger area by the total number 
of passengers.  Thus, the equation for passenger casualties is: 
2 ( )r xC y
S
π= •  
The computation of the probability density function for fatalities via simulation is 
accomplished by repeating the following steps many times.  Each pass through these steps 
is called a trial (or run of the simulation model).  Step 1: Draw a number, ,y  (sample) from 
the passenger distribution and another number, ,x  (sample) from the explosive distribution.  
Step 2: Compute the lethal radius, ,r  for the explosion using 2( )r x a bx cx= + +  and the 
lethal blast area, 2 ( ).r xπ   Step 3: compute the fatalities, ,C by multiplying the number of 
                                                 
159 This assumption is used to simplify this example model.  The author acknowledges that this is a 
simplifying assumption and further notes that the effects of clustering are partially accounted for in the final 
model described in the next chapter. 
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passengers on board, ,y  with the fraction of passenger area that is in the blast of the 
explosion ( S denotes passenger area on the ship):  
The total number of trials the model runs depends on the degree of reliability one 
desires in the result.  Usually, 1000-5000 trials are sufficient to obtain a reliable estimate of 
the probability density function for the consequence.  An example probability density 
function for fatalities is shown in Figure 6.  This corresponds to the probability density 
function introduced in Figure 1 on page 40. 
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Figure 6 Output Probability Distribution Function (Fatalities) 
 
The next step is to construct a risk curve from the distribution function.  This is 
accomplished by plotting values from the distribution function onto a graph with outcome 
and risk probability values.  Referring back to Figure 1, the area represented by R  
represents the percentage of the distribution that exceeds *c .  This is one slice of the 
distribution and represents a data point for the risk curve.  Figure 7 shows an example of 
how one data point is plotted using kc and its corresponding kr .  This process is then 
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repeated to show a representation of multiple data points from the distribution function 
plotted together to form the remainder of the risk curve (Figure 8).  More data points of 
course result in a higher fidelity risk curve. 
 
Figure 7 Risk Curve Construction Showing a Single kr  and kc  Plot 
 
 


















We now apply the risk curve construction step to the example model.  For this 
example the decision maker has set a threshold of 50 fatalities.  This equates to the kc  
value discussed previously discussed.  The data bar underneath the distribution annotated 
by a percentage in the white block and another percentage in the solid block shows the 
analyst to determine the kr  value.  In this snapshot, the kc  value is set at 50 and the R  
value is 68.41 percent (point A).  Repeating this construction for 10, 20,30...c =  gives the 





















Figure 9 Example Model Baseline Risk Curve 
 
Now that the baseline risk curve has been set, the analyst can incorporate policy 
alternatives.  For demonstration purposes, this example model incorporates one policy 
alternative in which the boat company limits the number of passengers their boats.  While 
this may seem unrealistic, it will convey the conceptual point.  
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To model this policy alternative the analyst will need several pieces of information.  
The first is updated or projected passenger data that needs to include projected maximum 
capacities and projected average number of patrons.  The projected maximum capacity is 
straight forward which is the new maximum allowed capacity.  The average number of 
riders can be calculated by assuming that the maximum number of patrons will not change 
but they will be distributed over a greater number of scheduled trips.  Thus, the resulting 
figures might be a maximum passenger size of 300 and an average passenger load of 150.  
To implement this in the model requires changing the previously defined passenger 
distribution.  Figure 10 depicts a side by side comparison of the original and modified 
distributions.  While the two distributions share a similar shape, the values associated with 
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Figure 10 Example Model Passenger Distribution Comparison 
 
Now that the passenger distributions have been modified, the next step is to run the 
model again.  Once again, the analyst is interested in reviewing the probability density 
function for the defined outcome pertaining to the number of fatalities.  Figure 11 depicts a 
side by side comparison of the pre-policy option output and the post policy option output.  
The analyst is able to examine the output and note the reduction in the mean fatalities from 
55.5 to 48.2.   
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Figure 11 Output Probability Density Function Comparisons (Fatalities) 
 
These distributions are then used to construct the pre-policy option risk curve and 
the post policy option risk curve for comparison purposes.  Figure 12 depicts a graph with 
both the pre-policy alternative risk curve and the post-policy alternative risk curve.  The 
comparison between the two reveals a reduction in risk:  with * 50,c =  R  = 0.51 with the 
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Figure 12 Model Example Risk Curve Comparison 
 
The last remaining step is to plot the risk curves on a graph with their corresponding 
costs.  The cost of the alternative presented here is driven by the cost of obtaining the 
smaller boats and the associated operating costs.  While the example incorporates only one 
policy option, the same methodology could be applied for multiple policy options.  The 
objective of the final plot (not included here) is to allow the decision maker to compare 
multiple policy alternatives, given their associated costs, and their impact on risk reduction. 
C. SIMULATION DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The example model presented so far has yet to address the required data to 
construct such a model.  The required data might not always be available or may be of 
suspect quality.  This will require the analyst to make assumptions along the way.  It is 
important to make note of data quality and assumptions so that decision makers have an 
accurate picture of the quality of the analysis on which they are making their decision.  
This section discusses the data necessary to construct a quantitative risk analysis model and 
addresses areas where assumptions are likely to be necessary.   
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1. Consequence Data 
Consequence data is more feasible to gather and quantify for incorporation into a 
risk model than threat and vulnerability data because it is easier to measure and often times 
already exists.  One approach to gathering this data is to first categorize the outcomes.  For 
example, if an explosive device were detonated within a city, different types of outcomes 
will occur.  These might include fatalities, injuries, tangible destruction of structure and 
equipment, or various types of economic loss.  Categorizing the outcomes allows the 
decision maker to focus efforts on distinct categories depending on where the greatest 
concern exists.  For example, the decision maker might care a great deal about loss of life 
or injuries and less about specific property damage. 
After defining the categories, it is necessary to determine what data is required to 
quantify the outcomes within each category.  For example, to quantify the potential damage 
to a structure or vessel, one must analyze the destructive potential of the explosive in 
question.  Specifically, if the analyst is concerned with a backpack bomb carried onto and 
detonated aboard a boat, one would have to know the type, quantity, and packing of the 
explosive.  Furthermore, one would have to know the structural damage that might result 
from the blast effects. 
Another element of the outcome data is the maximum potential losses for each 
category in question.  If the analyst wishes to evaluate potential fatalities resulting from an 
attack on a particular city, the maximum potential fatalities can be defined as the size of the 
population.  Or, if the analyst wishes to evaluate potential fatalities resulting from an attack 
on a ferryboat, the maximum potential fatalities can be defined as the passenger capacity of 
that ferryboat.  Furthermore, the analyst is also likely to know the average number of 
passengers on a ferryboat and can further refine the data set.   
Finally, the above data and information must be converted into a math model that 
explicitly identifies the uncertainties and suggest a probability model for each. 
2. Policy Alternative Data 
Once the consequence data is obtained, the next step is to obtain policy alternative 
data.  The required data for the policy alternatives falls into two categories.  The first and 
most obvious is the associated cost of each alternative.  This data is required as it will 
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ultimately be used by the decision maker to perform the risk versus cost analysis.  
Generally, this data is readily available since it is usually presented up front when a project 
or policy option is submitted for evaluation.  One additional consideration with cost data is 
the differentiation between immediate or “one time” costs, and maintenance or recurring 
costs.  A project such as installing security lights or cameras would consist of upfront costs 
for equipment and installation and minimal maintenance costs.  Conversely, a project such 
as a passenger/baggage screening service that utilizes security personnel to perform the 
screening will consist of some upfront costs to put the screeners in place and significant 
ongoing costs to keep the service in place.  
The second policy alternative data category involves determining how the various 
alternatives impact risk.  This data becomes slightly more problematic and requires more 
analysis.  First, in the words of Bruce Schneier, “security is a weakest-link problem [and 
therefore] attackers are more likely to attack a system at its weak points.”160  To that end, 
security alternatives generally focus on these weak points that equate to areas of 
vulnerability.  Therefore, for each alternative, an input is required to determine how the 
alternative will reduce vulnerability.  For example, consider an alternative involving human 
interaction such as a security service which will inspect bags to be carried on a ship, one 
must assess how much this reduces vulnerability.  It becomes subjective in that one can 
take a perfect world approach and say that the screeners will be 100 percent effective at 
catching a backpack bomb before it is carried onto a boat.  A more realistic approach is to 
accept the fact that screeners are human and are prone to oversights which means there is 
still a chance that a backpack bomb will make its way onto a boat.  Either way, the 
requirement is to obtain data that describes the effectiveness of the alternative under 
consideration. 
3. Assumptions 
When constructing a quantitative risk analysis model, an analyst will likely find 
areas where data is lacking.161  One way to fill these data gaps is to make assumptions 
which in turn need to be communicated clearly to the decision maker.  Additionally, an 
                                                 
160 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York, 
NY: Copernicus Books, 2003), 103. 
161 Molak, 9. 
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analyst should determine the ramifications of the assumptions and what model deficiencies 
might result.  One way to do this is to conduct a sensitivity analysis.  A sensitivity analysis 
allows the analyst to examine the impacts of variable assumptions on forecasts.162  
Significant changes between runs indicates that the assumption needs to be refined by 
acquiring additional data or leaving the assumed component out of the equation altogether. 
Realizing the assumptions cannot be completely eliminated, the analyst should 
attempt to characterize them as another variable of uncertainty and at least represent them 
using a distribution.163  This is conceivable given that the analyst most likely knows the 
lower and upper bounds of the data in question.  Once the lower and upper bounds are 
identified, the analyst can then specify the distribution shape that best characterizes the 






                                                 
162 Evans and Olson, 130. 
163 Ibid., 69. 
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V. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS MODEL APPLIED TO THE 
PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an illustration of our approach to the Port Security Grant 
Program (PSG).  Given the PSG emphasis on the improvised explosive device (IED) threat 
to ferryboats, this chapter first begins with an overview of ferryboats and their role in the 
maritime domain.  The remainder of the chapter focuses on the model construction to 
include a section on each of the threats: backpack IED, vehicle IED, and a small boat attack 
(SBA) IED. 
B.  FERRYBOAT BACKGROUND 
Ferryboats, similar to other public transportation vessels, represent a potential target 
with prevention and protection challenges.  Ferryboats come in many shapes and sizes, 
have varying degrees of passenger capacity, operate in many different ports, have dynamic 
schedules, and are often owned by private companies.  Also, some ferryboats have the 
capacity to carry vehicles as well as passengers.  Additionally, the location of various ports 
directly affects the quantity, type, and accessibility of civil boat traffic.  All of this 
information is relevant in one form or another to constructing a model that can accurately 
represent potential consequences of an IED attack against a ferryboat. 
Another important aspect of the ferryboat scenario is the terrorist’s objectives.  This 
study assumes that if a terrorist is to attack a ferryboat using an IED, one of their objectives 
is to maximize loss of life or injuries.  To that end, the terrorist is likely to carry out the 
attack in such a manner as to achieve this objective.  For example, in the IED in a backpack 
scenario, the attacker is likely to choose a ferryboat at or near maximum passenger 
capacity, use the biggest explosive charge conceivable in a backpack, and detonate the 
explosive near the biggest cluster of passengers on the boat. 
C.  BACKPACK IED THREAT 
One of the objectives of the model is to quantify the risk associated with the 
backpack IED attack on a ferryboat.  The model developed here focuses exclusively on 
outcomes related to immediate fatalities but can easily be adapted to economic damage, 
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hazardous materials, or other consequences.  This section will discuss the various 
components of the model: required data, output generation, and risk curves.   
1. Required Data 
To generate a probability distribution function for fatalities resulting from an IED 
onboard a ferry requires the analyst to consider what factors contribute to the number 
fatalities.  The two most obvious factors are passenger data and explosive size.  Passenger 
data includes passenger capacity, actual passenger load, and passenger density.  While 
passenger capacity is a constant, passenger load and density are variables and need to be 
represented by a data distribution.  One source of this data is historical passenger loads 
from which, one can fit this distribution. 
The first two pieces of passenger data are passenger capacity and actual passenger 
load.  The data used for this model comes from the Blue and Gold Ferry Fleet, which 
operates in the San Francisco Bay area.164  The company possesses 14 passenger and tour 
vessels that range in capacity from 300 to 700 passengers.  On the basis of this data, the 
model uses a maximum boat capacity of 500 which falls in the middle of this range.  
Furthermore, research conducted in 2002 suggests that ferryboats operating in the San 
Francisco Bay typically operate at an average of 33 percent of their capacity.165  Given that 
the need for mass transportation has risen in the San Francisco Bay area since 2002, and 
that an attack would likely take place during a high volume time, it is more realistic to use a 
higher passenger capacity percentage.  Thus, this model assumes the quantity of passengers 
to be a random variable, ,y  with a minimum quantity of zero passengers and a maximum 
quantity of 500 passengers.  The probability model representing y  is a truncated Gaussian 
distribution with (expected value) 400µ =  passengers and (standard deviation) 100σ =  
passengers.166 
 (400,100;0,500).y N∼  
                                                 
164 Blue and Gold Fleet, available from: http://www.blueandgoldfleet.com/Information.htm (accessed 
12 September 2006). 
165 CALSTART, Passenger Ferries, Air Quality, and Greenhouse Gases: Can System Expansion Result 
in Fewer Emissions in the San Francisco Bay Area? (California: CALSTART, 23 July 2003), 6. 
166 Similar to the example model presented in the previous chapter, the standard deviation is assumed 
and intended to represent a wide range of passenger loads.  This figure can be calculated if actual passenger 
data were available. 
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The final piece of passenger data is passenger density.  Typically, this is a function 
of passenger compartment size and layout.  For simplicity, this model assumes a single 
passenger compartment.  In reality, a ferryboat is likely to have many passenger 
compartments to include passenger space outside along the perimeter areas of the vessel.  
This model uses the approach of calculating a passenger density.  To do this, it was 
assumed that the passenger compartment was large enough to accommodate its capacity, 
given an assumed minimum required spacing of two feet between passengers.  Therefore, 
the passenger area was calculated using the number of passengers for a given run and a 
radius of two feet.   
The physical distribution of passengers within a passenger compartment can vary.  
One approach is to assume that all the passengers on the boat are evenly spaced throughout 
the passenger compartments on the vessel.  However, it is more likely that passengers will 
cluster at various locations on the vessel.  This becomes important because one can also 
assume that an attacker would tend to gravitate toward clusters containing higher 
concentrations of people in order to maximize attack effectiveness.  Therefore, the model 
does consider some limited effects of clustering.  To do this, the model acknowledges that 
clustering can occur and represents this phenomenon by drawing a random percentage of 
the total passenger load and placing them into a single cluster.  The cluster is further 
defined by a passenger density in which each person is separated from the other passengers 
by a space of two feet. 
The second major input to the model is the explosives data.  The analyst needs to 
consider several characteristics regarding explosives.  The first is the size of the explosive.  
When considering explosives carried in a backpack, the size of the explosive is limited by 
the size of the backpack and the attacker’s desire to conceal the explosive.  This model 
makes the assumption that a backpack capable of carrying 50 pounds of explosives 
represents a reasonable upper bound for the backpack size.  To model this, the size of the 
explosive device by weight is assumed to be a random variable, ,x  with a minimum size of 
one pound and a maximum size of 50 pounds.  The probability model representing x  is 
assumed to be a truncated Gaussian distribution with (expected value) 35µ =  pounds and 
σ (standard deviation) 10 pounds: (35,10;1,50).x N∼  
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The attacker makes a conscious trade-off between explosive size and the likelihood of 
detection but gravitates toward larger explosives sizes.  To represent this, the model 
calculates the mean using 70 percent of the maximum explosive size.  Thus, using an 
explosive size of 50 pounds, the mean is 35 (.70 * 50). 
The next piece of the explosives data is a relationship between the size of the 
explosive and associated fatalities resulting from the explosion.  Blast effect analysis shows 
how the impact of an explosion on a human body is a function of the level of overpressure 
at the point the blast wave reaches the human body.  The anatomically affected area leading 
to death is typically the lungs.167  Lung damage is a result of gas-tissue interface where 
spalling and tearing can occur, and the degree of damage is a function of positive pulse 
duration and peak overpressure associated with the blast.168  Another component of the 
blast that leads to fatalities and injures is fragmentation.  Fragmentation depends on the 
explosive casing and contents packaged with the explosive.  In some cases fragmentation 
can cause more damage than the overpressure.  Using the combined effects of overpressure 
and fragmentation, it is possible to determine a radius within which, a human is likely to 
sustain fatal injuries.  BlastFX™, Explosive Effects Analysis Software is used to compute 
the lethal radii where expected fatalities are predicted to occur.169  This data is then input 
into MATLAB® 7.1 to obtain a least squares for using a quadratic function.  The function 
representing the lethal radius for the backpack IED is: 
2.002818 .3634 6.89r x x= − + +  
Where ( )r x is the lethal radius as a function of explosive size .x  
2. Output Generation 
The initial output of the model is the outcome distribution for fatalities.  In order to 
run the simulation and generate this output distribution, a final relationship is required.  
The output is defined in terms of the number of fatalities resulting from a backpack IED on 
a ferry.  The basic approach involved using a relationship between lethal area and boat 
                                                 
167 Paul W. Cooper, Explosives Engineering (New York: Wiley-VCH, 1996), 417. 
168 Ibid., 417. 
169 Blast/FX™ Explosives Effects Analysis Software was created by Northrop Grumman for the 
Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Systems Engineering Branch.  The software was designed 
for security and engineering professionals concerned about the threat of explosions to facilities and their 
occupants.  For more information, see http://www.blastfx.com/ (accessed 1 November, 2006). 
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area.  The lethal area is calculated given the lethal radius, which is calculated using the 
equation generated using blast modeling and data fitting tools.  Next, the passenger area (or 
density) is calculated using a uniform dispersion of passengers with a minimum of two feet 
between them.  As mentioned previously, the effects of one cluster of passengers is also 
incorporated.  The number of passengers clustering is drawn as a random percentage of the 
total passenger load.  Finally, given the lethal area with the explosion centered in the 
passenger cluster, the number of fatalities is calculated by the percentage of total 
passengers that fall within the lethal area.  Therefore, the equation relating casualties to 
lethal radius and total passengers on-board at the time of the blast is 
 
2( )r xC y
S
π= •  
where C  denotes casualties, S  denotes the total area onboard devoted to passenger 
accommodation, r  denotes the lethal radius as a function of explosive size x  and y  
denotes the number of actual passengers. 
Now that the input relationship is defined, the model is set to run.  Running the 
model requires that the analyst specify the number of trials to run.  The number of trials 
becomes important in determining the overall fidelity of the output.  It is feasible to run the 
model multiple times using a range of iterations and examine its behavior to determine the 
point of diminishing returns.  For this model, the consequence probably distribution 
function is generated by running the model with 1,000 trials.  As the model steps through 
each trial, a data point from each input distribution (passenger load and explosive size) is 
taken, and a fatality figure is calculated.  In the end, these data points are used to construct 
a frequency histogram that is an estimate of the output PDF for fatalities. 
3. Construction of Risk Curve 
Once the output distribution of fatalities is generated from the 1000 trials, it is then 
possible to construct the risk curve using the same steps discussed in the previous chapter.  
Here we compute fatalities from 0 to 100 with an interval of 25.  At each of these data 
points, the percentage of the remaining distribution is used as a data point for the risk 


























Figure 13 Backpack IED Baseline Risk Curve 
 
4. Validation and Verification 
After running the model and prior to using the results for management action, it is 
important to validate and verify the output.  One method is to determine if the output is 
reasonably consistent with expectations.  Doing this requires an analysis of the raw output 
data containing the sampled explosive size.  The analyst must first ensure that the sampled 
data makes sense based on the defined input distribution for explosive size.  And second, 
the analyst determines if the resulting lethal radius fit the provided equation.  For this 
model, the analysis showed consistency in both cases. 
Another method is to modify the input distributions, re-run the model and determine 
that the change in the output distribution is consistent with expectations.  To accomplish 
this, the maximum explosive size is increased from 50 pounds to 75 pounds.  The expected 
result is more fatalities, or a higher mean for the outcome distribution.  The observed 
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behavior is consistent with expected results as the mean increased from 59.8 to 76.6 
(Figure 14).  Another expected result is a risk curve showing a higher level of risk.  This 
behavior is observed and is depicted in Figure 15.  As depicted, the increased explosive 
size shows a higher level of risk. 
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Figure 15 Sensitivity Analysis, Change in Backpack IED Risk Curve 
 
D.  VEHICLE IED THREAT 
The next threat simulated in the model is an IED placed in a vehicle onboard a ferry 
capable of transporting vehicles.  As with the backpack IED, the focus is exclusively on the 
outcome of fatalities resulting from the attack.   
Two significant differences were incorporated into the model to account for the 
vehicle IED threat.  First, the size of the explosive capable of being placed in a vehicle is 
much larger than that which can be placed in a backpack.  The most likely location to place 
a vehicle IED is in the trunk to minimize chances for detection.  This model assumes that 
the average trunk in a sedan style vehicle can conceal approximately 100 pounds of 
explosives.  Thus the Gaussian distribution was modified to have a mean 70Xµ =  pounds 
and standard deviation σ 20 pounds: (70,20;1,100).x N∼  
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Once again, the skewed distribution toward the higher explosive size represents the 
likelihood that an attacker would gravitate toward the higher end of the explosive spectrum. 
The second significant difference with a vehicle IED is the ferry compartment 
layout.  Vehicle compartments are typically located on their own level below the passenger 
level.  Therefore, the explosive effects are not only limited by the metal comprising the 
trunk itself but are also limited by the structure separating the two floors.  This 
phenomenon was represented by constructing a similar structural layout within the blast 
effects simulation in order to calculate the area of expected casualties.  Additionally, it was 
assumed that the attacker would not have any input on the placement of the vehicle 
onboard the ferry, and therefore the vehicle explosion was placed at the center of mass on 
the ferryboat by default.  The resulting function for the vehicle IED lethal radius function 
is: 
.05 13r x= +  
From here, the output probability distributing function is generated using the same 
formula for C  described previously.  Thus, the resulting risk curve is found at Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Vehicle IED Baseline Risk Curve 
 
E.  SBA IED MODEL COMPONENT 
The final threat simulated in the model is an IED placed onboard a small boat and 
used to ram a ferry.  As with the backpack IED and the vehicle IED, the focus is 
exclusively on the outcome of fatalities resulting from the attack.   
The SBA IED threat introduces several dynamics that significantly increase model 
complexity.  The effects of a SBA are a function of several factors, which include the size 
of the boat, speed of the boat, impact location, hull penetration, etc.  It is possible that a 
SBA would merely puncture a hole in the vessels thereby causing it to take on water as 
opposed to causing a significant number of fatalities.  Conversely, with the correct 
combination of factors such as hull penetration, delayed fusing, and a large enough 
explosive, it is feasible that numerous fatalities could result. 
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The USS Cole bombing provides one point of reference for this analysis.  Reports 
suggest that the attackers used a rubber style boat, similar to a zodiac, loaded with several 
hundred pounds explosives for the attack.  It is unclear if the ramming boat actually 
penetrated the hull of the USS Cole or merely pulled alongside it.  If a rubber style boat 
was used, it is unlikely that it penetrated the hull before detonating.  Regardless, the 
explosion created a 40-foot hole, killing 17 sailors and injuring 38 others.170   
From an input perspective, the SBA introduces complex modeling challenges.  The 
potential size of the explosive is relatively straight forward and bound by the size of the 
ramming boat.  The next factor deals with the origin of the blast itself.  The effects of a 
blast initiated outside the hull of the target vs. being initiated after hull penetration, are 
quite different.  For simplicity, this model assumes that the ramming boat penetrates the 
ferry before the explosive detonates.  This is feasible given that the attacking boat is a 
speedboat ramming a ferryboat with an aluminum superstructure which is not uncommon.  
To model the explosion from a small boat impact, the maximum explosive size was 
increased to 300 lbs with a mean of 200.  Thus the Gaussian distribution was modified to 
have a mean 200Xµ =  pounds and standard deviation σ 70 pounds. 
 (200,70;1,300).x N∼  
As discussed previously, the skewed distribution toward the higher end represented 
the likelihood that an attack would lean toward the higher end of the explosive spectrum. 
The other significant change is the origination of the blast.  With the backpack IED, 
for instance, it was assumed that the attacker would detonate the explosive at the center of 
mass of the largest cluster of people.  With a small boat attack, the attacker is not likely to 
have flexibility in choosing the impact point corresponding to the location of the greatest 
passenger concentration.  Therefore, the blast origin for the model was placed at the 
midpoint alongside the boat.  The resulting function for the SBA IED lethal radius function 
is: 
5 21.786 10 .05043 20xr x x−= + +  
                                                 
170 Yemen Gateway, “Attack on the USS Cole,” 17 December 2001, available from http://www.al-
bab.com/yemen/cole2.htm (accessed 19 September 2006). 
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From here, the output probability distributing function is generated using the same 


























Figure 17 SBA IED Baseline Risk Curve 
 
F.  INCORPORATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
Alternatives, or policy options, will ultimately reduce risk.  The extent to which an 
alternative reduces risk is the key to decisions based on risk reduction.  To model this 
requires information about the alternative.  This information includes a description of the 
alternative, intended effects, and potential effectiveness data.  In some cases, these data 
may be difficult to predict and require drawing on the past performance of similar 
programs. 
The first alternative ( 1a ) is strictly focused on reducing the risk associated with a 
backpack IED.  One version of this alternative might be to reduce the size of carry-on bags 
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or completely eliminate the option for passengers to carry bags on the ferry.  The latter is 
on the extreme end of the security countermeasure spectrum and may seem unrealistic.  
Limiting the size of a carry-on, however, is somewhat more realistic and can be done in a 
similar fashion to the airline industry in which the carry-on must fit inside a specifically 
sized container.  The ultimate effect of this type of alternative would be a reduction in the 
size of explosive that a potential terrorist could carry in a backpack on a ferry. 
To model this alternative requires adjusting the explosive’s size distribution to 
account for the smaller carry-on bag.  To represent this, the alternative defines a maximum 
backpack size that in turn reduces the maximum explosive size from 50 pounds to 40 
pounds.  Thus, the resulting distribution function is 
 (28,10;1,40).x N∼  
A second alternative ( 2a ), is a screening program with two components.  The first 
component involves some type of x-ray device to scan carry-on bags.  The second 
component involves the inspection of vehicles by a security screener.  As with any security 
program or procedure, there is the question of effectiveness.  If an x-ray device were 100 
percent effective in detecting explosives in carry-on bags, the risk of a backpack IED 
would effectively be reduced to zero.  However, this is usually not the case as x-ray 
machines are not 100 percent effective.  For this alternative historical data from a similar 
program is useful.  Studies conducted on weapons detection have shown that x-ray 
machines can be up to 95 percent effective.171  However, the weaker element in the 
screening process is the human screener who screens the vehicles or interprets the x-rays.  
The Federal Aviation Administration has conducted studies in which inspectors have 
attempted to smuggle weapons onboard airlines, and they report an 80 percent detection 
rate.172  This seems to indicate a 15 percent reduction in detection (from 95 percent) based 
on the human element. 
With this kind of data in hand, the risk analyst can incorporate the alternative 
effectiveness factor to determine the effect on risk.  For modeling purposes, the analyst 
                                                 
171 William A. Crenshaw, “Civil Aviation: Target for Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political Science 498, (Jul, 1988), 64. 
172 Ibid., 65. 
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must now consider that given an IED attack in a backpack, what is the likelihood that the 
screening process will detect the explosive and stop the attack?  By incorporating this into 
the model, a new risk curve can be developed that represents the reduction in risk resulting 
from the incorporation of the alternative at hand. 
The third alternative ( 3a ), is a ferry passenger and boat rental patron screening 
system that is similar to the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS) 
system.  CAPPS is a system that attempts to screen individuals based on travel patterns, 
financial transactions, personal records, and law enforcement and intelligence databases.173  
For simplicity, this alternative simply runs a background check to determine if the person is 
on the Terrorism Watch List, has an outstanding arrest warrant, or has been flagged by the 
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) system.  US-VISIT is 
supposed to provide a mechanism to track non-immigrants who overstayed their visas.174  
Modeling this alternative poses the greatest challenge of the three in that there is little open 
source data that indicates how effective a system like this might be.  This is mostly due to 
the similar systems mentioned being relatively new with little history upon which to draw 
effectiveness data. 
The problem facing the manager of the Port Security Grant Program is to decide 
which, if any, of these alternatives is to be funded.  A risk-based approach requires that the 
decisions be a function of the extent to which each alternative reduces risk.  In terms of the 
notation of Chapter III, the set of alternatives contain three elements: 
  1 2 3{ , , }.A a a a=  
Each of these requires a budget, so the budget requests are contained in another set of three 
elements: 
  1 2 3{ , , }.B b b b=  
The decision to be made by the manager is now expressed by the values assigned to the 
three elements of the decision set: 
                                                 
173 Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Sensitive Security Information and Transportation Security: Background 
and Controversies, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 5 February 2005), 4. 
174 Lisa M Seghett and Stephen R. Vina, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Program, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 26 January 2006), 1. 
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   1 2 3{ , , }.D d d d=  
For example, if the manager decides on funding all three alternatives then {1,1,1}.D =   To 
solve the decision problem, the manager requires three risk measures: 1 2 3( ), ( ), ( )R D R D R D  
where for notional convenience we use 1( )R D  to denote ( )R D when {1,0,0},D =  2( )R D  
to denote ( )R D when {0,1,0},D =  and 3( )R D  to denote ( )R D when {0,0,1}.D =   These 
risk measures then give rise to three risk reductions: 1 2( ), ( ),R D R D∆ ∆  and 3( )R D∆  that 
serve as the basis upon which the decisions are made.  The next step is to compute each 
alternative’s risk measure and the associated risk reduction (relative to the baseline or “do 
nothing” situation).  To accomplish this, re-compute the fatalities under each of the 
alternatives. 
The model for casualties C  is dependent on the alternatives and is expressed as: 
  
2( ( ))( ) .r x DC D y
S
π= •  
Where ( )x D  signifies the dependency of the explosive weight (size) on the decision.  If 
1 1d =  then, then policy option 1a  is implemented and the size restriction limits the 
explosive to no more than 40 pounds. 
Furthermore, if 2 1d =  then policy option 2a  is also implemented and: 
  0x =  with probability dP  while 
  (28,10;1,40)x N∼  with probability 1 dP−  
Where dP  is the probability of detection of the x-ray process.  This includes two factors: 
the effectiveness of the x-ray machine and the effectiveness of the human screener.  If the 
explosive is detected then 0x =  which means there is no explosive.  However, detection 
probability is not known with certainty and is only an estimate.  To capture this effect, dP  
is treated as uncertain and is modeled using a Beta(p,q) distributed random variable.  
Numbers from this distribution range between 0 and 1 with mean value = p/(p+q). 
In summary, this type of analysis is then repeated for all additional alternatives 
being considered.  It is also important to consider the possibility that an alternative is 
effective at reducing the risk for more than one threat.  This model incorporates the three 
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alternatives previously discussed.  The first alternative is aimed only at preventing the 
backpack IED threat.  The second alternative is aimed at preventing the backpack IED 
threat and the IED in a vehicle threat since the screening system screens carry-on bags and 
vehicles.  The third alternative is aimed at preventing all three IED threats: the backpack 
IED threat, the IED in a vehicle threat, and the small boat IED attack.  The third alternative 
accomplishes this by screening all potential ferryboat passengers and may prevent them 
from boarding the boat.  Also, the third alternative screens potential boat renters in the 
general vicinity of a port and may prevent them from renting a boat. 
The resulting risk curves for the backpack IED threat for all three alternatives are 
presented in Figure 18.  Prior to analyzing the risk curves, the decision maker must specify 
*c  (maximum accepted value of risk).  For this example, it is assumed that the decision 
maker has set * 50.c =   An analysis of the risk curves shows that each of the alternatives 
has some risk reducing effect for the backpack IED.  Moreover, alternatives 2a  and 3a  are 
the more effective with alternative 2a  being the most effective.  These results are 
consistent, given that alternatives 2a  and 3a  are screening programs that may prevent an 
attacker from placing an IED onto a ferryboat.  However, the difference in risk reduction 
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Figure 18 Risk Curves: Backpack IED Baseline and Alternatives 
 
The resulting risk curves for the vehicle IED threat for alternatives 2a  and 3a  are 
presented in Figure 19.  Alternative 1a  is not shown, as it has no effect against the vehicle 
IED threat.  An analysis of the risk curves shows that both alternatives 2a  and 3a  have 
some risk reducing effect for the vehicle IED.  Furthermore, alternatives 2a  indicates a 
more risk reduction than alternative 3.a   This is consistent, given that alternative 2a  
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Figure 19 Risk Curves: Vehicle IED Baseline and Alternatives 
 
The resulting risk curve for the SBA IED threat for alternative 3a  is presented in 
Figure 20.  Alternative 1a  and 2a  are not shown as they have no effect against the SBA 
IED threat.  An analysis of the risk curve shows that alternative 3a  is effective at reducing 
the risk for the vehicle IED, which once again is consistent given that the probability of 
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Figure 20 Risk Curves: SBA IED Baseline and Alternative 3a  
 
G. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
Having explored various aspects of applying a model to the Port Security Grant 
program, the final step is to present the output in a manner that allows the decision maker 
to evaluate the risk reduction potential given the cost involved.  A risk analysis model, 
despite the level of detail, is of no value unless the results are understandable, believable, 
and tailored to the problem at hand.175  Moreover, considering that QRA uses complex 
models involving probability distributions and statistics, understanding QRA results can be 
a challenge for decision makers.  It is therefore imperative that the results of a model be 
presented in a form that is clearly understood by the decision maker and aids in the 
decision making problem. 
                                                 
175 Vose, 267. 
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The research objectives of this study were to present a methodology that meets the 
criteria outlined by the abundance of policy guidance documents and to present an 
alternative approach to using a single number when attempting to quantify risk.  The 
approach presented here utilizes distribution functions to better inform the decision maker 
on the nature of the uncertainty and the risk.  A final objective of this study was to 
incorporate an approach that allows a cost tradeoff analysis and highlights the robustness of 
resource allocation in the area of port security.  Homeland security policymakers should 
have the means to connect the risk to the resources allocated.  This section addresses the 
final research objective and shows how risks and costs can be connected in order for the 
decision maker to make resource allocation decisions.  
1. Identification of Costs Associated with Identified Alternatives 
Each of the policy alternatives presented to the decision maker will have a required 
budget (cost).  Some costs may involve a one-time purchase and installation of equipment 
such as a fence or a lock.  Other costs may be more long-term, such as a contract that 
includes security personnel or maintenance of a system.  Additionally, there are indirect 
costs associated with security alternatives.  For example, Schneier discusses security costs 
for the air travel and states that “most countermeasures that increase the security of air 
travel certainly cost us significantly more money, and will cost us in terms of time and 
convenience.”176  Schneier makes the point that the mere loss of time also equates to loss 
of money. 
Given all the potential types of costs, a determination is required to distinguish what 
costs to include into the risk versus cost analysis.  The inclusion of upfront costs such as 
the costs associated with the purchase and installation of equipment is a good starting point.  
One way to capture the long-term costs is to use life-cycle cost.  This concept includes both 
one-time and recurring cost such as annual labor and operations expenses.  
Generally, projected costs are provided upfront when a contractor is bidding for a 
project.  In the case of the Port Security Grant Program, applicants are required to specify 
                                                 
176 Schneier, 18. 
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their projected costs as part of the grant application.177  The applicant guidance kit provides 
a budget detail worksheet to be submitted with their application.   
The costs of the three policy alternatives that are incorporated into the model for 
this project are notional and are for example only.  The notional costs for each of the 
alternatives are listed in Table 2.  Policy alternative 1a  will incur a slight upfront cost to 
install a mechanism for checking bag size.  However, most of the cost associated with this 
alternative will instead come in the form of lost revenue for the ferry company as a result of 
patrons choosing other forms of transportation for the inconvenience.  Policy alternative 2a  
does involve both up front costs in terms of x-ray equipment and a contract to pay the 
screeners.  Policy alternative 3a  involves contracting a company to construct a computer 
system and the costs of installing the system and associated networking components at all 
the ferry terminals and boat rental locations for a given port resulting in the highest price 
tag. 
 
Policy Alternative Cost 
Maximum Carry-on Policy ( 1a ) $100,000 1( )b  
Bag and Vehicle Screening Program ( 2a ) $500,000 2( )b  
Personnel Screening System ( 3a ) $700,000 3( )b  
Table 2 Policy Alternative Costs 
 
2. Construction of Risk versus Cost Plots 
Once the cost for each of the alternatives is obtained, the data can be plotted on a 
graph along with the corresponding risk.  The risk values are taken from the model 
simulation as discussed in the previous section.   
Next the risk and cost are plotted on one graphic so that the decision maker can 
compare cost and risk among multiple alternatives (Figure 21).  This plot shows each of the 
alternatives plotted where the x-axis represents the cost and the y-axis represents the risk.  
Additionally, the baseline data points are plotted for reference purposes to show the 
existing risk level with none of the current alternatives being implemented.  The analyst 
                                                 
177 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program: Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit, D-1. 
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must remember that the data risks plotted are associated with the consequence type and 
threshold defined by the decision maker.  In this scenario, the consequence type is fatalities 
and the threshold is 50.  This number is set by the preferences of the decision maker to 
represent the unacceptable outcome. 
The following provide several examples to the reader as to how to read and 
interpret the graph.  Once again, when referring to risk, it referrers to the risk of fatalities 
exceeding 50.  Thus the baseline risk of a backpack IED attack, a vehicle IED attack and an 
SBA IED attack is .78, .47, and .97, respectively.  The same logic applies to reading the 
risk for each attack type given the policy options 1,a  2,a  and 3.a   For example, given 
policy option 3a , the risk of a backpack IED attack, a vehicle IED attack and an SBA IED 
attack are .38, .24, and .48 respectively.  Additionally, the cost to implement the 
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Figure 21 Risk versus Cost Plot 
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Figure 21 indicates that all three alternatives are somewhat effective at reducing the 
risk associated with a backpack IED attack.  Also, only alternatives 2a  and 3a  are effective 
at reducing the risk of a vehicle IED.  While, only alternative 3a  has any effect on reducing 
the risk of a small boat attack. 
If the decision maker’s priority is a robust policy option that reduced the risk of all 
three threats, the best option would be alternative 3a .  This alternative, however, comes 
with the highest price tag.  On the other hand, alternative 2a  might look more attractive 
given either of two conditions.  First, the decision maker is more concerned about the 
backpack and the vehicle IED threat and not as much about the small boat attack IED 
threat.  Or second, the decision maker is budget constrained and only has $500,000 to 
allocate to the port security grant program.  In the first condition, the decision maker 
concern is driven by likelihood of occurrence.  Importantly, this is not factored into model 
and can be subjective.  As previously discussed, the risk presented here is strictly in terms 
of consequences. 
This policy options analysis approach clearly offers a way for the decision maker to 
view risk versus cost tradeoffs in one product.  The decision maker is able to evaluate and 
prioritize policy alternatives in an effort to maximize robustness and achieve the greatest 
risk reduction for the given costs.  This fulfills the final research objective and offers one 
possible answer to one of the DHS IG’s critiques of the PSG.  Additionally, the approach 
addresses recommendations made from the 9/11 Commission pertaining to effective 
resource allocation based on risk. 
H.  MODEL OMISSIONS 
The model constructed for this thesis was designed to provide a simple yet accurate 
representation of the required steps to perform a quantitative risk analysis.  Therefore, there 
were several details that were intentionally omitted in an effort to reduce the complexity.  
The omitted details were not necessarily due to lack of data availability but in most cases is 
due to lack of data access.  The details omitted on the basis of simplicity warrant a brief 
overview. 
First, in order to model the effects of an explosion onboard a ferryboat, the exact 
layout of the vessel should be represented.  This includes the various passenger levels, 
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placement of compartments, construction of walls and floors between compartments, 
location of glass windows, etc.  The model here examined immediate fatalities that directly 
resulted from the explosion itself as a function of overpressure and explosive casing 
fragmentation.  Other factors can certainly contribute to fatalities such as the possibility of 
drowning, ensuing fires following an explosion, or person who initially receive serious 
injuries that lead to a delayed death. 
Second, various types of explosives can be used for an IED.  The model here 
incorporated only TNT.  A more detailed model would include the spectrum of explosives 
such as Ammonium Picrate, HBX-3, Military Dynamite (MVD), Pentolite, Torpex, and 
Tritonal, just to name a few.178  The ability exists to model other explosives from a blast 
effects perspective by converting the explosive type into a TNT equivalent weight. 
Finally, the present model incorporates only one possible outcome resulting from an 
IED attack on a ferry—fatalities.  A decision maker might be interested in other outcomes 
such as injuries, immediate and long-term economic damages, and psychological effects.  
Each of these components could be incorporated into the model using the same steps 
described previously.  The injury component is fairly straightforward and not difficult to 
model.  One challenge with injuries however, is that they can vary in range of severity and 
the analyst must decide how to characterize the injuries. 
The ability to model economic damages is not as straight forward.  Immediate 
economic damage such as the cost of the boat itself either in terms or repair or replacement 
costs, is easily quantifiable.  The long-term economic damages are more challenging to 
measure.  These might include aspects such as loss of revenue over some period of time 
resulting from the loss of a ferryboat and the reluctance of the population to utilize that 
mode of transportation both at the affected port and at other ports across the country. 
In summary, the model omissions were a function of simplification and data 
availability.  Every scenario that an analyst attempts to model will have unique 
characteristics.  The scope of analysis will drive the level of detail required.  The bottom 
line is that if the decision maker wishes to use QRA, a comprehensive model can be 
constructed with the applicable details included assuming access to the required data is 
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available.  In situations where the required data is not available, assumptions or 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS 
This study explores two research areas.  First, it presents a methodology by which 
risk is quantitatively assessed and determines its feasibility for homeland security resource 
allocation.  In doing so, this study presents a quantifiable definition of risk.  This study also 
showed that uncertain variables can be represented using a range of values (distribution 
function) as opposed to single point estimates.  Addressing the second research area—
communication of risk to decision makers—this study demonstrates that it is possible to 
translate the effects of policy alternatives on risk into management action so that decision 
makers can effectively allocate limited counter terrorism resources.  In exploring these 
areas, this study has shown that there are benefits and challenges to using QRA for 
homeland security resource allocation.  This section summarizes these benefits and 
shortcomings and provides recommendations for homeland security policymakers 
considering using or mandating a risk-based approach for allocating resources. 
1. Benefits of Quantitative Risk Analysis for Homeland Security Resource 
Allocation  
There are numerous advantages for using quantitative risk analysis for homeland 
security resource allocation.  QRA offers a systematic analytical process that provides 
policymakers with estimated risk reduction potential associated with policy alternatives.  
The process acknowledges that while risk generally cannot be eliminated, measures can be 
taken to help reduce it.   
Risk analysis has a proven track record.  Many industries with characteristics 
similar to homeland security have successfully used QRA.  These typically include 
industries focused on improving safety, including environmental or nuclear plant safety.179  
The insurance industry also uses QRA to evaluate relationships between smokers and lung 
cancer.180  The same analysis can apply to areas of homeland security when evaluating 
relationships between terrorist attacks and consequences.   
                                                 
179 Molak, 6-7. 
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One of the primary advantages of quantitative risk analysis is that it provides the 
ability to address significant amounts of uncertainty.  The primary source of uncertainty 
includes the variations and errors that occur in the attempt to assign estimated values to 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence.181  This uncertainty is best represented through 
probability distribution functions as opposed to single point estimates.  Furthermore, using 
a probability density function reduces the effects of subjective judgment by representing 
variables using a range of possible values as opposed to a single value.   
A risk-based methodology can also help the decision maker perform a cost benefit 
analysis by showing the tradeoffs between resource allocation and risk reduction.182  This 
study demonstrates this by showing how decision makers can view the risk versus cost 
trade-off for a given policy option in a single dimension.  Furthermore, the methodology 
developed here gives decision makers a tool for analyzing multiple policy options on one 
product so that they can make decisions as to what combinations of policy alternatives 
represent the most effective use of limited resources.  
Finally, as the 9/11 Commission concluded, a risk-based approach to resource 
allocation can help reduce organizational and political bias that can sometimes influence 
decisions.183  Most state and local officials would argue that more resources are needed for 
homeland security, but not all sectors or cities face equal risk of being the target of a future 
terrorist attack.  A risk-based approach can help reduce political bias and guide decision 
makers toward more objective reasoning. 
2. Challenges with a Quantitative Risk Analysis for Homeland Security 
Resource Allocation  
The first challenge is inherent to the definition of risk itself.  First, there is a 
distinction between qualitative versus quantitative risk.  This study focused on quantitative 
risk and highlighted in detail the many variations of its definition of risk.  Most of the 
definitions presented here use the concepts of threat, vulnerability, and consequence in one 
form or another.  Breaking risk into the components of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence is problematic.  Regarding the threat component, there is a distinct difference 
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182 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, A Risk Management Approach Can 
Guide Preparedness Efforts, 2. 
183 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 396. 
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between identifying what bad things can happen and assigning a likelihood value to the 
possibility of that event occurring.  Initial attempts to quantify the threats for this research 
proved futile.  Most threat data comes from intelligence channels but are often times vague 
and subjective.  A better approach is to view the threat as what bad things can happen and, 
more importantly, what the outcome would be should an attack happen.  Thus, it is more 
feasible to focus on vulnerability and consequence.   
While it makes some sense to separate vulnerability and consequence, they are 
intertwined.  For example, a policy option that limits the size of an explosion will 
obviously limit how many people get killed or injured.  On the other hand, a policy option 
that might thwart an attack altogether not only reduces vulnerability but also, by default, 
reduces consequences since the attack doesn’t happen.  Therefore, a better solution is to not 
waste time differentiating the two and accept the fact that they are intertwined.  This results 
in modeling them together during the QRA process.   
Another challenge with QRA is the necessary detail and the amount of data required 
to implement it.  The process of generating the necessary data distributions and 
constructing the required databases takes time.  Furthermore, the data can sometimes be 
difficult to obtain and, where data is not available or cannot be obtained, one is forced to 
make assumptions.  This was the case in this study, primarily due to the lack of access to 
data.  The data required to remove the assumptions made in this PSG model is generally 
available, given the required access.  The level of effort required to implement QRA for 
homeland security may seem high, but it can be done if decision makers are willing to do 
so. 
Part of the reason for gathering the required data and generating distribution 
functions is to reduce subjectivity.  However, despite efforts to reduce subjectivity, it 
cannot be eliminated.  This is evident during the construction of the model when, despite 
reasonably available data that described the upper and lower ends of the distributions, 
assumptions still must be made in regards to the shape or type of distributions to 
appropriately characterize the data.  Furthermore, assumptions were made as to how the 
attacker would carry out the attack.  For example, would the attacker always detonate an 
explosive near the biggest cluster of people?  Or using a SBA attack, would the attacker 
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always try to impact the target boat center of mass?  While these questions represent only a 
sample of areas where assumptions are required, decision makers using QRA need to 
realize that subjectivity cannot be completely eliminated.  
If decision makers choose to use QRA, analysts need a way to present the results so 
that decision makers can interpret and evaluate them.  Since quantitative risk analysis is 
heavily reliant on mathematics, the challenge is to present the data in such a way that a 
decision maker can interpret the results and thus, make effective policy decisions.  One 
solution is to “black box” the inner workings of the methodology and present decision 
makers with easy-to-read output graphs.  However, it is also necessary that the decision 
maker understand the assumptions and limitations with the methodology, which demands 
some level of understanding of how the black box functions. 
One example of the black boxing concern is found with the USCG and their 
Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM).  MSRAM is a tool used to calculate 
risks for threats to individual ports using the components of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence.184  The user primarily interacts with the system by assigning vulnerability 
and consequence values to threat scenarios.  When interviewed, USCG end users clearly 
described their interface to the system and its output, but the inner workings of the system 
were not as clear.  For example, when asked about the origins of the threat data, the 
response was “Higher headquarters assigns those,” and there is little information as to 
where the numbers originate.185 
3. Recommendations for Policymakers  
Having reviewed the advantages and challenges of QRA, several conclusions can 
be drawn.  First, QRA can be an effective decision support tool.  QRA offers one method 
for conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis with the measure of effectiveness being an 
estimated risk reduction.  The general concept of risk analysis seems to be widely accepted 
for helping policymakers make resource allocation decisions in a resource limited 
                                                 
184 Interviews between U.S. Coast Guard Officials and the author on the topic of port risk assessments 
and MSRAM, 14 April 2006.  
185 Ibid.   
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environment.186  Others contend “Risk analysis can be a very valuable tool to bring  
all the available facts to the discussion table.”187   
Nonetheless, while risk analysis is a valuable tool, it must be used with caution.  
The level of caution should be proportional to the uncertainty of calculations and degree of 
assumptions.  A carefully performed risk analysis must be accompanied with all the 
assumptions and uncertainties clearly defined.  Too many assumptions and too much 
uncertainty can become problematic and can only complicate the decision making process.  
For this reason, analysts should only apply QRA to areas were enough data is available to 
adequately define the distributions used in constructing models.  Based on this study, the 
type of data that is generally more available is consequence data, as opposed to probability 
of occurrence (threat) data.  Importantly, this allows decision makers to use QRA for 
applications beyond terrorism such as natural disasters since the focus is on the undesirable 
outcome and not the cause.  It is widely accepted that risk management has applications to 
natural disasters as well as terrorism.188  When considering an undesirable event, the 
outcomes may be the same regardless of whether terrorism was the cause or a natural 
disaster was the cause.  Therefore it makes sense to channel efforts to reduce vulnerabilities 
and mitigate consequences.  
Next, homeland security resources should not be allocated exclusively based on 
QRA results.  QRA should be used in combination with or in addition to other resource 
allocation methodologies.  This allows the decision maker to make decisions based upon 
data from more than one source.  Therefore, policy makes should use caution when 
attempting to “mandate” a risk-based approach as the sole method for allocating resources.  
Molak echoes a similar thought: 
The other group of people, represented in Congress and federal government 
agencies, is very much enamored with risk analysis and is trying to pass 
laws and establish regulations that would mandate risk-benefit analysis.  In 
such proposals, risk analysis is treated as a panacea, as if the results of risk 
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187 Vlasta Molak, “Conclusion,” in Fundamentals of Risk Analysis and Risk Management ed. Vlasta 
Molak (New York: Lewis Publishers, 1996), 426. 
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analysis are not subject to uncertainty inherent in complex social systems.  
The overuse and over-trust in numbers derived from such risk analysis could 
be very dangerous for general democratic processes and may gridlock the 
decision-making process.189 
One example of combining methodologies can be found in the DHS National 
Preparedness Guidance.  This guidance provides direction on how to implement the 
National Preparedness Goal which serves the purpose of “establish[ing] measurable 
priorities, targets, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for 
assessing the Nation’s overall level of preparedness.”190  The National Preparedness 
Guidance recommends a capabilities-based planning approach consisting of ten steps to 
meet the National Preparedness Goal.  While each of these steps will not be discussed in 
detail here, a common theme found throughout the steps is that the type and level of 
identified capabilities is proportional to their ability to reduce risk.191  Thus, using the 
approach presented in this study, QRA can be combined with capabilities-based planning to 
direct efforts in the context of capabilities as opposed to dollars. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The model constructed for this study provides a basic example of QRA and 
demonstrates the feasibility of the methodology.  There are numerous areas where model 
enhancements can improve its accuracy and usefulness.  Additionally, it is valuable to 
consider applications for QRA beyond the Port Security Grant Program.  To that end, the 
author concludes with a discussion on implications for expanding the scope of analysis for 
the QRA methodology presented in this study. 
1.  Model Refinement 
First off, numerous assumptions are made either for simplicity or due to insufficient 
access to data.  One area is the ferryboat structure itself.  The model here assumed a single 
passenger compartment when, in reality, there are multiple passenger compartments 
separated by various structures such as walls and glass.  These items would certainly have 
an effect on the blast effects associated with a detonation of an explosive onboard a 
ferryboat. 
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Another area for model refinement is the data distributions themselves.  Most of the 
distributions used here were normal distributions.  A more thorough way to specify the 
distributions is to obtain actual data and perform a data fit.  An example of this is the ferry 
boat utilization rate.  This data is generally available given the proper “need to know.”  
Using historical data, where they exist, the analyst can define a more accurate distribution 
that better represents the range of uncertainty.  
2.  Incorporation of Multiple Consequence Types 
The model constructed here focuses exclusively on a single representation of 
consequence: fatalities.  It is reasonable to expect that a decision maker would also be 
concerned about injuries, structural damage, economic losses, and psychological effects on 
the population.  Future expansion of the model can include these other factors.  This would 
allow the decision maker to look at the cost versus risk tradeoff for individual 
consequences or to look at an aggregate risk value representative of multiple consequences. 
3.  Policy Analyst Interface 
The model described thus far and the policy alternative analysis is done using the 
student version of the Microsoft Excel “add-in” program @Risk.  For this type of model to 
be useable for an average policy options analyst, a simple end-user interface is necessary.  
This would most likely consist of some type of graphical user interface (GUI) where the 
user would simply input data into an input screen.  This GUI would act as the interface to a 
“back box” that would perform the risk number crunching and then display the results to 
the analyst in a user friendly interactive manner.   
Adding a GUI to the model developed here requires modifications but is feasible.  
In addition to the GUI, it is necessary to incorporate a database containing several different 
types of data.  One piece of required data is the threat information.  In this context, threat 
information consists of a list of threats selectable by the analyst as opposed to likelihood of 
occurrence.  For example, they might include: SBA IED attack, Backpack IED attack, and 
Vehicle IED attack.  Furthermore, each of the threats may require amplifying information.  
For example, if the analyst selected the SBA attack, he might also specify boat type, 
explosive type and quantity, and impact parameters.  Ultimately, the level of model detail is 
dependent on the specifications provided by the end-user. 
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Beyond the threat data, the analyst will also need to provide information about the 
consequences of concern.  Once again, these might include fatalities, injuries, immediate 
damages, and potential long-term economic damages.  The analyst would not only need to 
specify the consequence type, but also a threshold level for analysis.192 
The final input concerns policy options and costs.  The analyst would need to 
provide the system with enough information about the projects to redefine the affected data 
distributions in order to calculate updated risk curves.  For example, a policy option 
consisting of a screening component would require an estimate of effectiveness.  This 
estimate may or may not be readily available bases on similar screening components used 
previously.  Finally, the analyst would need to provide the system with cost data associated 
with the policy options.  
In addition to the user inputs, the system would need to contain several databases or 
have access to them.  These databases would include information such as ferry boat types, 
boat configuration data, and passenger capacity.  Another database might include 
explosives and blast effects.  Since the number of explosive types varies considerably, a 
database is the best option to maintain a complete list. 
Regarding outputs, the system would automatically generate the risk versus cost 
curves for the decision maker.  The system would provide various options for formatting 
the data, such as the ability to plot a single policy alternative or a combination of selected 
policy alternatives.  This data would be plotted on a graph similar to the one shown in 
Figure 21. 
4.  Implications for Expanding the Scope of Analysis 
The research presented here focuses exclusively on the Port Security Grant 
Program, which is primarily concerned with the IED threat to ferryboats.  This represents 
only a small subset of the port security threat.  Other port security concerns include 
container security, land-based attacks against port facilities, and sea-based attacks against  
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liquefied natural gas vessels.193  Resources are being applied in these areas in addition to 
the PSG program.194  Thus, decision makers at this level face the same problem of how to 
effectively allocate finite resources. 
The QRA approach presented here demonstrates that an analyst can determine 
changes in risk associated with policy options.  This application is not restricted to the Port 
Security Grant Program and can be extended to include other areas in port security and 
even maritime security as a collective.  Expanding the level of analysis to include the entire 
scope of maritime security encompasses other maritime threats that are not necessarily port 
related.  For example, these include areas such as maritime domain awareness, cruise 
missiles, mines, and underwater attacks using SCUBA gear.195  Expanding the scope of 
analysis to these other areas does not significantly change the resource allocation problem 
and the methodology still applies.  One could even consider applying the methodology 
beyond maritime security to other areas of homeland security.  
While expanding the scope of analysis for QRA seems feasible on the surface, 
making that transition is not without challenges.  For instance, as the elements of risk are 
examined at higher levels, the bounds of the associated distributions expand greatly.  Using 
an extreme example at the homeland security level, one could argue that the range of 
consequences spans from zero to the entire population of the United States.  Granted, this is 
unlikely and the associated probability is quite low the possibility exists.  Importantly, 
policymakers should note that as the scope broadens, the bounds of uncertainty expand as 
well. 
In conclusion, the risk-based approach presented in this study showed that QRA can 
be an effective decision aid for homeland security resource allocation.  This requires data 
and mathematical modeling of factors and uncertainty which is not a simple feat.  
However, just because it is difficult does not mean that it should not be done.  QRA can 
direct the decision maker’s focus on the relevant factors required to effectively allocate 
limited resources.  Furthermore, it forces decision makers to think about the problem and 
minimize the effects of external factors, such as political pressures.                                                  
193 Frittelli, 6. 
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